

A Policy Paper

“JnNURM and the urban poor”

**under the TULCI component
of the GOI-UNDP project on**

National Strategy for the Urban Poor

June 2007

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Glossary

JNNURM: Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission

CEPT: Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology

UNDP: United Nation Development Programme

CDP: City Development Plan

EWS: Economically Weaker Section

NGOs: Non-governmental Organizations

NIUA: National Institute of Urban Affairs

MLAs: Members of Legislative Assembly

DPRs: Detailed Project Reports

GDP: Gross Domestic Produce

CBOs: Community-based Organizations

BPL: Below Poverty Line

UIG: Urban Infrastructure and Governance

BSUP: Basic Services for the Urban Poor

NSUP 'National Strategy for the Urban Poor'

SJSRY: Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana

KMA: Kolkatta Metropolitan Area

MCH: Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

AMC: Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation

AUDA: Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority

IT: Information Technology

ULBs: Urban Local Bodies

PPP: Public Private Partnership

DFID: Department for International Development

Introduction and Background to the Policy Paper

The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), announced by the Government of India in 2005 with a total outlay of Rs 100,000 crores, is aimed at strengthening infrastructure and the overall quality of life in the 63 cities listed in the Mission document. According to the Mission's funding requirements, listed cities have to, in the first instance, submit City Development Plans (CDPs) and later, Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), justifying their requests for funding from the JNNURM coffers. Further, the Mission's funds will be channelled through two formally defined sub-missions: that of Urban Infrastructure and Governance (UIG) and Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP). The JNNURM document also lists several mandatory as well as optional reforms that competing cities have to promise to undertake in order to qualify for funding.

The National Institute for Urban Affairs (NIUA) is one of the important nodal agencies tasked with evaluating CDPs submitted in the first round for JNNURM funding. Further, the NIUA has also been asked to prepare Urban Poverty Reduction Strategies for 12 JNNURM cities under the Government of India-UNDP project 'National Strategy for the Urban Poor' (NSUP).

There has been concern articulated at various levels that the Mission component directed at the most vulnerable sections of the country's urban population, the BSUP, may not have been sufficiently supported, either at the level of the Mission itself or by the cities that have submitted proposals for funding. It was in this context that this current policy paper based on a detailed study and analysis of 15 CDPs submitted by various cities to the NIUA for evaluation - including the 12 that have been further identified for NSUP funding - was undertaken by the current researchers.

For the purposes of this final report, all the 15 CDPs chosen for focussed study as part of the current policy paper - those for Chennai, Chandigarh, Bangalore, Pune, Ahmedabad, Ludhiana, Jaipur, Mumbai, Indore, Kolkatta, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Guwahati, Coimbatore and Raipur - have been studied in complete detail, and the significant

features of these CDPs have been recorded in the form of comparable matrices (see Annexures). Guwahati, Coimbatore and Raipur are the three cities for which UPR proposals are not currently required.

The CDPs have been analysed on the basis of several parameters, but with particular concentration on their involvement with the sub-mission on Basic Services for the Urban Poor (BSUP), as delineated under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). The CDPs have also been studied in the context of the prescriptive requirements of Toolkit 2 of the JNNURM, on the basis of which they were required to be prepared by the various city governments. The final section of the report will include an analysis of the Toolkit itself, as well as recommendations for a supplementary Toolkit that will help to address several significant issues that we believe the original Toolkit is disturbingly silent on.

Section I

Economic transition and associated livelihood issues for the disadvantaged

This section of the report analyses the 15 selected CDPs in terms of their perception of shifts in the nature of employment and the city's overall economy; the impact of such shifts, if any, on the nature of employment for the poor; the extent to which the cities concerned have focussed on job training and job creation and provision in the informal and unorganised sectors that most affect those in the lower rungs of the economy and, finally, on the availability, if any, of infrastructural and financial support for the exercising of livelihood options by the poor in the context of a potentially changing economic scenario.

Certain clear trends are observable in all the CDPs. For instance, most of them identify - or express the desire for - a movement of employment from the primary and secondary sectors to the tertiary, services-based sector. Some of the CDPs even acknowledge that this shift is linked to a parallel move towards increasingly unorganised and informalised - and poorer paid - forms of employment. However, there is often very little discussion about how such an economic transition may be made - or indeed, whether it is imperative that it be made at this particular point in time in the case of all the cities concerned - while also accommodating the needs of all sections of the respective cities' populations. It often appears as if the preparers of the CDPs feel that it is obligatory for them to make such an economic transition, whether or not they have the means and the tools to do so - because the JNNURM expects them to all make this shift and encourages them to base their infrastructural requirements on the expediencies of such a transition.

Hyderabad is, of course, a classic example. After stating that "over the past couple of decades, Hyderabad's economy has shifted from a primarily service city to a more diversified profile comprising trade, commerce, industry, transportation, storage, communication and construction sectors," (Hyderabad CDP: 6), the document goes on to say that the "economy of Hyderabad is witnessing a transformation from traditional manufacturing towards a knowledge-based economy. This is primarily due to policies of the state government to promote [the] knowledge sector and tourism through a series of initiatives and programs" (*ibid*: 7). On the very next page, though, the document admits that Hyderabad does not compare favourably with other Indian metros either in terms of average gross district product per capita or the proportion of low-income households (*ibid*: 9), and the CDP offers no suggestions as to how these problems might be dealt with in the state-directed march towards a knowledge-based economy.

The Hyderabad CDP also acknowledges the contribution of the informal sector to its economy, estimating that more than 30 per cent of its workforce is employed by this sector, earning between three and 6.5 times less than its counterparts in the organised sector. The document quotes a study conducted by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation in 2001 that indicates that the informal sector accounts for over half of all employment in a majority of the cities in the country, and that their share in urban employment is increasing. In a manner familiar to several of the CDPs, this document suggests that the city is tackling the increasing impoverishment of its working class to some extent through centrally sponsored schemes like the Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) (*ibid*: 71). A proposal for “evolving a comprehensive livelihood policy” for the poor is, however, mentioned as part of ‘Poverty Reduction – Investment Plan’ for 2005-2012, with, however, no money allotted for it from any source (*ibid*: 153).

Further, the CDP mentions that some socio-economic programmes that help women and “weaker sections” by generating self-employment through skill improvement are under implementation through self-help groups and other community structures under the aegis of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, though again, no further details are provided.

Mumbai is another city that appears to accept the shift from a manufacturing to a service-based economy as inevitable and desirable, even if it means the absolute loss of jobs and stagnation in the local economy: “There has been a steady shift in employment from the secondary to the tertiary sector in Greater Mumbai... However, the growth in overall employment has been very low at just about 1 percent per annum during 1980 to 1998” (Mumbai CDP: 28). Mumbai also quotes the suggestion made by the McKinsey report commissioned by the state government that all traditional (but small-scale) industrial activity be dispersed to a doughnut-shaped core around Greater Mumbai, and that the area within this doughnut be limited to ‘clean’ modern-sector employment-generation activities. The automatic corollary is that the poor who will work in the ‘dirtier’ industries will also be moved to the periphery, and that heavy industry has absolutely no place in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region even at the cost of employment.

The Mumbai CDP also discusses plans to create 500,000 “low-end, service-sector” jobs in the three areas of construction, hotels/tourism/recreation and modern-format retail over a 10-year period and thereby “enhance the Mumbai GDP growth rate by 1-2 per cent. This exercise will involve upgrading various existing city attractions and creating new ones, allowing Mumbai to “truly become a city that never sleeps” by allowing shops, restaurants and bars to keep flexible operating hours (meanwhile, as one knows, other state mandates have curbed employment opportunities for women in many of these establishments), and increasing “flexibility” in land-use and zoning regulations and in the matter of permissions and labour laws. It is suggested that the construction of “large outlet malls on the highways” must be motivated, which action will “boost the construction and retail industries which are the key drivers of economic growth and employment” (*ibid*: 148). Since this discussion about the boosting of the city’s economy is

extraneous to the requirements of the JNNURM, there is no mention here of how finances for the less obviously private-sector activities might be raised.

The Mumbai document discusses its hawkers-control policy in some detail in a separate annexure, explaining that this policy is being implemented strictly under the direction of various Supreme Court orders. The document also states that there are only 14,973 licensed hawkers in Mumbai, that no new licences have been issued since 1970, and that a survey carried out on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai estimated that there were over 100,000 unlicensed hawkers in Mumbai in 1997. The document is silent about how this apparently intractable problem might be resolved.

The Mumbai CDP does not discuss any programmes that might offer credit or support for unorganised or informal sector livelihood activities.

Bangalore claims to have a “strong and balanced economy... stimulated by light and heavy engineering (automobiles, earthmoving and aeronautics), textiles, and high technology”. However, though public sector undertakings and the textile industry “initially drove Bangalore’s economy... the focus in the last decade has shifted to high-technology service industries”, the CDP states (Bangalore CDP: 16). Quoting the United Nations Human Development Report 2001 as having ranked Bangalore as the fourth highest “technology hub of the world”, the CDP says that “in future, it is anticipated that the resources fuelling the economy will flow from human capital (*ibid*: 47).

The “imperatives for the development of industry” are to “maintain and enhance Bangalore’s status” as an “eco-friendly, high tech industry and services” centre in which industrial development will be “sequestered to planned zones” and the sectors that will contribute to the city’s growth in the future will be those of IT, education and healthcare (*ibid*: 47). Further, though it gloats that the annual growth percentages are about “3% for the total population; 6% for employment; and 9% for incomes, it admits that “the inequality of this latest growth leads to increased difficulties for the urban poor and to a growth in the city’s slums (*ibid*: 19). Though the CDP document then claims that the “growth in poverty levels is mitigated to some extent due to the availability of jobs provided by the growing services sector” (*ibid*: 19), it gives no further details about these jobs, and does not discuss the informal sector, where these jobs are probably located, at all. There is, therefore, no platform available in the Bangalore CDP for the discussion of livelihood support in the informal sector.

The CDP for the **Kolkatta Metropolitan Area (KMA)** tracks a subtler shift. The “structural changes in the economy of the KMA” attributed “partly [to] the process of economic liberalisation... in the entire country since the early 1990s” have resulted in the share of the primary sector falling and that of the secondary as well as tertiary sectors increasing as a proportion of overall economic growth, the CDP reports (KMA CDP: I-34). However, the primary sector has not been written off completely, with investments planned to boost the fish, poultry, dairy, fruit and market gardening sub-sectors (*ibid*: II-4,5).

Simultaneously, it is observed that though investment and value addition in the manufacturing sector have increased, says the CDP, the total number of registered working factories has gone down in the post-liberalisation period. Further, the document finds it “interesting” to note that “labour-output ratios” have declined in the same period, and adds that this decline may be “explained by the increasing adoption of capital-intensive or labour-saving technologies in manufacturing processes”. The phenomenal growth of the construction sector and small-scale industries, as well as of the tertiary sector thanks mainly to the “overpowering entry and expansion of banking, insurance and real estate activity... as a fallout of the various reforms carried out in the economy in the wake of economic liberalisation” is also noted as a distinct shift in economic activity in the KMA (*ibid*: I-41-42). Meanwhile, the proportion of urban people living in slums has “not declined” during these economic boom years (*ibid*: II-35). There is a brief reference to “two livelihood projects and some short run interventions started for local economic development” (*ibid*: II-40).

There is an awareness of the “considerable incidence of unemployment” there will be “in the years to come”, and it is suggested that “the promotion of labour-intensive methods of production in industries in general and [the] encouragement of small-scale industries and self-employment activities in particular” will improve the situation. There is repeated stress that employment generation should be prioritised with appropriate actions for investment, including the designing of necessary steps to provide both legal and other forms of security to borrowers seeking bank finance for economic pursuits. The enhanced participation of women is envisioned, and the Kolkatta Metropolitan Area will involve individual Urban Local Bodies in designing and imparting vocational training and helping the self-employed to market their products and services. Some existing local initiatives will also be taken up for support. No specifics in terms of details or financial outlays for these plans have been given, but then, even the level of detail provided is beyond the requirement of the JNNURM. One problem with the Kolkatta CDP, however, is that all the above information is rather poorly organised and scattered in sections throughout the document, rendering their review and analysis relatively difficult.

Chennai reports the almost total decline of the primary sector, which is not surprising, and “the emergence of new-economy industry coupled with a sound manufacturing base” that includes light, medium as well as heavy industries (Chennai CDP: 1). The CDP does state that over 90 per cent of Chennai’s working population is engaged in the tertiary sector, primarily as main (as against marginal) workers. The CDP also makes detailed projections about the numbers of additional jobs the city will have to create over time, and implies that the growth in industrial and new-economy activities will meet this demand – given the support of JNNURM-financed infrastructure – but does not go into any more detail about employment provision.

The informal sector has not been discussed independently. However, the Chennai CDP does discuss the linking of livelihood issues to the city’s economic growth. Along with

creating infrastructure and a policy framework that will attract new economic activity, Chennai proposes to encourage the development of small-scale industries to “achieve accelerated industrial growth” but also to create additional employment in the Chennai Metropolitan Area “by facilitating a series of fiscal and infrastructure interventions”. Further, the CDP declares the city’s intention to impart vocational skills to enhance the capacities of the unorganised sector and to strengthen institutions involved in capacity-building, and to encourage investments by the private sector to achieve economic growth and generate substantial employment” (*ibid*: 116).

Ahmedabad is very clear about the shift in the nature of employment, too, though figures that reflect the actual degree of the shift are only available for 1971 and 1991 – that is, for the period before the phase of intense economic liberalisation. Between 1971 and 1991, employment in the secondary sector declined from over 50 per cent to a little over 42 per cent, and the tertiary sector filled the gap, the primary sector having been less than a per cent in both time periods. Even though there are no specific figure available for 2001, and “there has been a rapid growth of chemical and petrochemical industries in south Gujarat”, the preparers of the CDP are able to observe that a “sectoral shift has been observed... after liberalisation... The investment figures show a significant decline in the share of industries in and around Ahmedabad. On the other hand, [the] tertiary sector is gaining share, which includes business and commerce, transportation and communication, construction activities and other services” (Ahmedabad CDP: 13-16).

The Ahmedabad CDP does try to address the issue of unemployment resulting from the economic shift. Remarking that the decline of the textile industry has resulted in the redundancy of a “major section of the labour force”, the report explains that the “surplus labour, which was unable to enter the formal market/sector, was mainly absorbed in the informal sector” which, the document claims, today provides direct employment to 100,000 people, indirect employment to three times more people and creates a business volume of Rs 40 million every day. This contribution of the informal sector to the tertiary sector is provided as the justification for infrastructure development with JNNURM support (*ibid*: 24). A study done by Uma Rani and Jeemol Unni in 2002 has been quoted to state that the growth of employment is faster in the informal than the other branches of the tertiary sector, and that informal sector jobs account for 77 per cent of all jobs and 47 per cent of the city’s total income. “In short,” the study concludes in an unusually formal acknowledgement of the value to the city of this class of employees, “the poor contribute to the globalising economy of Ahmedabad as much as the non-poor [do]. But the poor do so without receiving... due economic or other civic facilities or services at par with the non-poor,” the document declares in a chapter on “Urban Poor and Housing” (*ibid*: 71).

Though the manner in which services for the poor are dealt with follow the bifurcated format dictated by the JNNURM Toolkit, this reference to the contribution of the poor to the city’s overall economy is a simple yet unusual one as far as the CDPs studied go. There is also a proposal for vocational training for youth from urban poor families who

have dropped out of the formal education system, under which 20,000 young people are to be trained at a cost of Rs 5,000 each over a period of five years. This manner of referring to projects that are clearly imperative for the target population as well as the overall economic development of the city, even if they are not covered by funding under the programme in question, is unique to the Ahmedabad CDP (*ibid*: 77). There is also some mention of a city livelihood programme being drafted, though no further details have been provided about this subject.

Ahmedabad is also notable in that it is one of few cities that gives details of credit provision for both livelihood and shelter-building activities for the poor. In the case of livelihood training as well as credit provision, it is clearly the intervention of SEWA and its related organisations that have made this difference.

Pune styles itself as driven by both the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, with auto and auto-ancillary, higher education, IT, BT, the agro and food industries all booming. However, Pune sees itself as losing out to other cities in terms of new investment in the auto as well as the IT sectors, and puts this down to infrastructural deficiencies (Pune CDP: 16-22) – which it hopes to remedy with JNNURM funds. Pune has also found a way of integrating the city’s rag-pickers (waste-sorters) into the formal solid-waste management system, by registering over 4,000 them and issuing them tags that authorise them to sort waste at municipal dumps. These rag-pickers are required to buy uniforms at their own cost and the city will bear no liabilities on their behalf, though (*ibid*: 75).

While there is no specific discussion of other informal-sector work in the main body of the Pune CDP document, a report of a stakeholder meeting includes a presentation made by Pune Municipal Corporation representatives, in which one slide is titled “Strategies – Work and Livelihood”. This slide addresses the subject in some detail, starting with the aim of ensuring the “availability of work... throughout the year and access to (the) means (for people) to carry out their occupation”. The proposals include the registration and regulation of all workers in the informal sector, the sector-specific provision of services in consultation with the respective groups, such as the creation of hawker zones and sorting sites; the provision of affordable public transport and the “upgradation of livelihoods through vocational training and (the) restructuring of livelihoods to the extent possible”. It is also suggested that slum relocations “take into consideration (the) occupational profile of the slum dwellers to minimize disturbance in livelihood patterns” (Pune CDP Annexure 4: 22).

Chandigarh also declares a shift from “traditional manufacturing to a knowledge-based economy” and attributes this shift to policies pursued by the Central and local governments that promote the “knowledge sector and tourism” (Chandigarh CDP: 19). The need for a “coordinated strategy to disperse economic activities in a sustained manner” is discussed (*ibid*: 22). In a separate chapter devoted to the BSUP sub-mission, there is some discussion of unorganised and informal sector employment. There is the acknowledgment that the “income per employed person in the organised sector may

vary from 6.5 to 3 times the income per [person] employed in the informal sector, which offers employment to more than 30 per cent of the city's industrial workforce. Adding that the "people involved in the informal sector constitute a major portion of [the] urban poor as these units have a low labour income though the entire family might be involved", the report laments the fact that there is no convergence in the various centrally and state sponsored programmes for poverty alleviation (*ibid*: 56-58). There is also mention of the need for a street-vendor policy – something many of the CDPs mention in passing – typically with no detailing – probably because it is a topic that is flagged in the JNNURM Toolkit.

While there is no systematic detailing about how and where livelihood options might be provided for the poor, there is a sentence in the chapter on 'Urban Environment and Heritage' that mentions, somewhat out of the blue, that the running of "decentralised (plant) nurseries" supported by the Horticulture Department could provide employment options to urban slum-dwellers, especially women who could work in their own backyards, while at the same time helping to green the city.

Ludhiana, a second-tier city in the JNNURM hierarchy, is a notable exception in that it does not make any mention of a transition to the tertiary sector, ongoing or anticipated. Though the Ludhiana CDP does not provide statistical details on the subject, it does state quite unequivocally that the city has witnessed "enormous industrial growth during the last 10 years... in small scale as well as in heavy and medium-scale industry" (Ludhiana CDP: 1-5). It mentions the utilisation of almost Rs 19 million under the SYSRY, the details of which have not been provided (*ibid*: 10-6).

And **Jaipur**, where almost 64 percent of the working population is involved in tertiary sector activities like trade and commerce, transport, storage and communications, as well as tourism-related jobs, admits that there are "high and rising levels of unemployment" and "increasing marginalisation and casualisation of labour" (Jaipur CDP: 4-19), which are "not good for the economy" (*ibid*: 4-1). It is, however, not clear how many of the proposed industrial ventures such as the 'World Trade Park', 'IT City', 'Knowledge Corridor', 'International Convention Centre' or 'International Golf Course' will help to reverse the accelerating process of the marginalisation and informalisation of labour. The proposal to set up organised commercial spaces for wholesale and retail markets is perhaps the only provision that will impact the lives of poorer workers, though if such a reorganisation is conducted without due convergence between living and working spaces and other conveniences, its effect will at best be marginal.

Jaipur has tried to benefit from central programmes like the SYSRY, through its Urban Self-Employment and Urban Wage-Employment programmes, but as has been pointed out, funds from the Centre have been very thin on the ground and the bulk of the programmatic support has come from state government funds. **This goes to show that with a clearly articulated convergence between the JNNURM and employment-generation or support programmes, as well as adequate financial backing, an overall**

impact on urban poverty that goes beyond the mere upgradation of infrastructure might be attempted by at least some JNNURM cities.

Lucknow, Indore and Raipur are good examples of smaller cities in which there has been a substantial shift from primary and secondary sector employment to the tertiary sector. The **Lucknow** CDP states that the informal sector should be given special attention in the master plan for the town; it mentions that some degree of support is offered to this sector through programmes such as the SJSRY and leaves it at that (Lucknow CDP: 39).

The **Indore** CDP makes the nuanced and pertinent observation that while the main income earners in high-income group families were likely to be in formal employment, among the lower-income groups, “less than half of the main income earners considered themselves to be in formal employment” (Indore CDP: 31). Interestingly, the idea of segregating industries and industrial workers from the rest of the city, that is now being envisaged with palpable longing by cities like Mumbai, was put into practice in Indore as early as 1918, when the Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar put into practice the city-improvement plan suggested by Sir Patrick Geddes. Indore’s economy, built on the trade of opium grown in the hinterland, has had a strong trade-and-commerce mooring from the very beginning (*ibid*: 4, 10, 19). Over time, the manufacturing industry centred around cotton textiles, metals and machinery also grew, but at the same time, the participation of the workforce in the tertiary sector went up from 54 per cent in 1961 to over 63 per cent in 1991.

Indore proposes a corporation-assisted slum-rehabilitation and employment-generation programme, and other resource facilities like community development groups and the creation of rag-pickers’ societies in slums. Indore is also unusual in that it discusses the creation of hawkers’ zones and locations for weekly informal bazaars (haats) in various places around the city. There is some discussion of the high-profile Indore Habitat Improvement Programme conducted with British government support which had, among its aims, the increase of the income-earning potential of the residents of selected slums, and was eventually considered to have failed – among other things, due to the insufficient involvement of the target population in the planning and implementation of the project (*ibid*: 68).

The **Raipur** CDP points out that as a major market centre for all of Chattisgarh, the city has traditionally had a high proportion of people employed in the areas of trade and commerce, transport, storage, communication and other related services, but that this proportion has gone up from a little over 67 per cent in 1991 to over three-fourths of the city’s total workforce in 2001 (Raipur CDP: 19), and its recent status as the capital of a new state has gradually turned it into an “education hub” (*ibid*: 1). This document also acknowledges that an estimated 45 per cent of the total industrial workforce is employed in the unorganised and informal sectors, and that the income per employed person in the organised sector is estimated to be four to six times more than the income of those employed in the informal sector. The Raipur CDP quotes the same study conducted by

the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation that the Hyderabad CDP quotes, about the nature of informal employment in the country (*ibid*: 73), which indicates that the informal sector accounts for over half of all employment in a majority of the cities in the country, and that their share in urban employment is increasing (*ibid*: 73).

Like many other cities, Raipur claims to have benefited from national poverty alleviation programmes such as the SJSRY. Based on such statements made by some cities, one may make a strong argument that it is important for a programme like the JNNURM to be explicitly linked to other national programmes that address parallel but relevant areas, for the programme to be truly effective. Raipur does not discuss the provision of space for the conducting of informal livelihood activities except to state that dairies are to be shifted from central locations to the periphery of the city.

The **Coimbatore** CDP appears to be confused about its definitions of what constitutes the secondary and tertiary sectors. Though it states that 90 per cent of the city's total workforce is employed in the tertiary sector, the document explains at various other points that included in the 'tertiary' sector are the areas of livestock and mining apart from household industries (Coimbatore CDP: 14) as well as industries and related ancillary activities (*ibid*:19). A table that provides the break-up of employment in the textile, foundry, electrical manufacturing and small-scale units in and around Coimbatore (*ibid*:15) also makes it clear that traditional manufacturing industries have, in fact, been identified as being part of the 'tertiary' sector and continue to provide an overwhelming (and increasing) number of jobs in the Coimbatore Corporation area. The focus on IT as a future employer is of course there: "Owing to the presence of numerous engineering colleges in and around Coimbatore and the proposals for [the] emergence of IT industries, [IT] would also serve as a potential employment base and present a great opportunity for the development of Coimbatore," the document states (*ibid*:19). It is also pointed out that Coimbatore has always served as a major commercial hub for towns and villages around it. In the case of Coimbatore, the IT industry appears to be treated as yet another avenue for future employment, not as a part of some fundamental economic shift.

The Coimbatore CDP details a stable corporation-run education system, with a noon-meal plan that feeds over 20,000 children every day and four career guidance centres for corporation-school students. Various cash gifts and gold medals are given to merit students, and coaching classes for entrance examinations to professional courses are conducted (*ibid*: 93). Though the presence of informal work in the service and commercial sectors is acknowledged, there is no further discussion about how those engaged in this work may be supported, apart from a reference to the need to support informal recycling activities in the area of solid-waste management. There are proposals for the construction of markets for meat and fish, fruits, flowers and vegetables; though there is no special mention that these locations will provide space for informal sector entrepreneurs to operate, one may perhaps assume they will. The SJSRY has also been discussed as a source of employment support to the urban poor, especially women,

though it is mentioned that the urban local body is not involved in the programme, which is administered through Central and state government funds and cleared by the banks that support the project at the local level.

Interestingly, garbage sorting and recycling are areas that many cities have identified as important sites where the involvement of the informal sector may be encouraged, though there is almost no financial commitment made or offered by the cities concerned to those involved in these activities. There merely seems to be an acknowledgment that those involved in this often hazardous activity are performing a useful civic function and therefore must be tolerated.

Guwahati has a somewhat different economic profile in that a majority of its workforce has always been dependent on government and public sector jobs; 83 per cent of the working population is employed by the tertiary sector, and further, 45 per cent of these tertiary-sector workers declare themselves as employed in “other services” (Guwahati CDP: 26). Industrial activity is, of course, centred around tea, oil, wood and handicrafts. However, given that the government of Assam perceives the IT sector as occupying “a key position in our modern age” (*ibid*: 32), there is an aggressive push by the government to encourage economic growth and workforce development in this area.

Like many other urban agglomerations, Guwahati is preoccupied with the “informal sector trades and services” that locate themselves strategically in the areas where people congregate. Unlike many other cities that have submitted CDPs, though, Guwahati has devoted a page or so of its CDP to a discussion of its plans for this section of the workforce. Among other things, Guwahati plans to locate its informal sector services in regulated, limited zones with “suitable public conveniences and solid waste disposal systems” provided (*ibid*: 34).

The preparers of the Guwahati CDP are not alone in bemoaning the fact that there are several national, international, state and local level programmes targeted at improving the lives and livelihoods of the poor, but there is very little convergence or coordination between these myriad programmes, and that this often leads to the duplication and resultant loss of effectiveness of these programmes.

Though Guwahati’s proposal to incorporate the informal sector “in trade in the planned development of various zones” is not very different from similar proposals currently being discussed in many other cities: most of these city proposals have not discussed their ‘hawkers’ zones’ plans in their CDPs, perhaps because they view the JNNURM’s concerns as being with big development projects and not micro-level city planning efforts. This is a pity, because the issue of hawkers is quite central to both economic and planning activities in most urban centres, and one which is actually exercising a lot of these cities’ energies on the ground at this point in time.

Section Conclusion and Recommendations

It emerges quite clearly from the above analysis that there is a strong sense in India's major urban centres that the ongoing shift towards a mainly tertiary, service-based economy also involves a move towards the increasing informalisation and casualisation – and cheapening – of work at the lowest and fastest-growing end of the employment pyramid. Few cities, however, appear to focus on how they might deal with this disturbing trend. The JNNURM's pointed statement that it is not concerned with employment generation could well be one reason why the issue has not been better addressed by these CDPs.

Most cities fail to provide meaningful livelihood plans for the poor. Of course, as discussed earlier, the JNNURM specifically states that it will not support employment budgets, but this does not mean that the cities need not include employment-generating activities or livelihood-training in their own plans and budgets, especially in a context where many of the CDPs make a note of the increasing informalisation and casualisation of work, and of the overall slowdown in job creation. The cities that do mention existing programmes that aim to impact the economic lives of the poor generally refer to national initiatives like the SJSRY, and complain about the lack of convergence between such programmes and others like them on the one hand, and overall slum improvement initiatives on the whole. This is a complaint that needs to be taken seriously if maximum impact is to be achieved from major national missions such as the JNNURM.

Many cities discuss the spaces where the poorer sections of the workforce operate only in the context of shifting them out to the periphery of the city or circumscribing them in some way, even as they acknowledge that this section of the workforce is growing exponentially, in absolute numbers as well as in terms of its contribution to the economy, and must somehow be accommodated.

By aggressively promoting the idea that it is concerned with financing high-profile infrastructural initiatives above all else, the JNNURM is perhaps encouraging cities to indulge their own instinctive biases against the everyday lives and livelihoods of the lowest rungs of their workforces. Apart from questions of fair distribution, this orientation also makes the overall development goals of these cities virtually unachievable, given that the poor – and their places of work and residence – constitute the most visible as well as statistically significant components of every JNNURM city's fabric.

Section II

‘Visions’ for the future

It is interesting to note that the specific, so-described ‘vision’ for the future articulated by each city after a period of consultation with various stakeholders rarely includes a mention of the above-described economic transition. As is generally known, every city is required by the JNNURM to articulate a ‘vision’ for itself. To quote Toolkit 2: “Developing a vision for the city is central to the preparation of a CDP. A vision is a statement of where the city wishes to go, within a given timeframe...”¹

Our analysis therefore also scrutinised the ‘visions’ articulated by the cities included in our study. Interestingly, most of them had rather specific, down-to-earth ideas of where they hoped to be in the years to come, and especially at the end of the seven-year project period of the JNNURM, though some catch-phrases that are popular elements of the articulated aspirations of city governments competing in an economically globalised world do pop up at regular intervals, such as ‘world-class city’ and ‘global city’.

Hyderabad articulates an interestingly balanced vision: “Hyderabad’s vision is to be an inclusive and futuristic city providing high quality services with universal access including the poor. It will be a slum free, citizen friendly, well-governed and environmentally friendly city”, the CDP says, managing to include all the aims of the JNNURM in one well-articulated sentence. Individual vision statements, such as this one: “Our vision is to delight customer by providing pressurised continuous water in an equitable, efficient, sustainable manner and create Hyderabad a world-class city”, are further articulated under each sub-section of the urban infrastructure component of the CDP document (Hyderabad CDP: 89- 109).

Mumbai’s vision statement is “Transform Mumbai into a City of the Millennium”. Like many other cities, Mumbai states that the vision statement was the result of “extensive deliberations on the subject. With the somewhat understated admission that the “quality of life in Mumbai however has slightly worsened”, the vision statement explains that Mumbai has to develop on “both fronts – economic growth and quality of life”. The CDP further explains that Mumbai’s vision statement has been guided and supported by the now-famous McKinsey study, which identified six core areas where improvements would have to be made for Mumbai to become a “world-class city”: economic growth, transportation, housing, other infrastructure (which includes “safety” as well as water supply, education and healthcare), financing and governance. Mumbai has also decided to “understand whether it is possible for Mumbai to achieve Vision Mumbai” by “benchmarking” itself with the cities of Cleveland (U.S.A.), Shanghai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Surat, Nagpur and Thane. The conclusion reached is that in all these “city transformations” and others in Singapore, London and New York, the three constants were economic growth, “high-impact projects with public-private partnerships” that helped the city achieve “*visible impact*” (emphasis added), and “a committed leader ably

¹ JNNURM Toolkit 2, p. 16.

supported by a well coordinated body of administrators” (Mumbai CDP: 142-146). Mumbai believes that all of the above are possible, of course with the support of the JNNURM. There is no specific mention of the poor in Mumbai’s CDP vision statement.

Bangalore actually articulates two separate visions for the two sub-missions of the JNNURM. The ‘initial formulation’ of the vision statement expresses the desire to “transform Bangalore as world-class metropolis” (Bangalore CDP: Volume – 1: 44), and the ‘final vision statement’ detailed in the UIG volume incorporates other such ideas: “Bangalore has evolved as a cosmopolitan and lovable City, with a global presence. To retain its pre-eminent position as a *City of the future*, the City shall enable and empower its citizens with... [h]igh-quality infrastructure for transport and communication... [r]esponsive and efficient governance” (Bangalore CDP Volume - 1: 45, emphasis in the original). The “vision for Bangalore in respect of” BSUP is different, and appears to supplement the earlier vision, rather than focus on the needs of the poor themselves, stating somewhat ominously that it dreams of a city with “no more new slums” and that it wishes for “Bangalore to emerge as (a) high tech knowledge city treating its less fortunate brethren in a humane manner through effective municipal administration” (Bangalore CDP: Volume –3: 5.1).

Kolkatta’s stated vision is “to provide (a) sustained and improved quality of life through basic urban services in an inclusive manner and (to) create (an) enabling environment for attracting domestic and international investors to live, work and invest in (the) Kolkatta Metropolitan Area”. Again, this is a carefully balanced and articulated statement, with the word “inclusive” indicating an acknowledgement of the city’s less fortunate inhabitants.

Chennai says that “[t]he vision for Chennai in the next 20 years is to develop it as a Prime Metropolis”, which will ensure the “delivery of equitable services”, and render the city “economically vibrant”, environmentally sustainable”, and with “better assets for... future generations.” (Chennai CDP: 115).

The Chennai Plan then goes on to articulate supplementary visions under each service area, for instance, in the area of water supply, it says: “The vision is to enhance customer satisfaction by providing pressurised continuous quality water in an equitable, efficient, sustainable manner and create Chennai a world-class city” (*ibid*:117). It is interesting to note that Chennai has been able to include both the key words “equitable” and “world-class” in the same short vision statement.

Ahmedabad’s vision for itself is somewhat more succinct and cryptic: “Vibrant Ahmedabad – Vibrant Gujarat” (Ahmedabad CDP: 127). A few pages later the same document explains that this slogan is “in essence” the short version of a slightly longer vision statement: “Vibrant, productive, harmonious, sustainable and environmental friendly, clean and liveable city having a responsive local government offering its citizens a good quality of life” (*ibid*: 133). This statement purports to be what “the citizen

said” (*ibid*: 133), though unlike many other CDP documents, this one does not discuss any details of stakeholder consultations held in order to arrive at the vision statement.

The **Pune** CDP actually details the consensual process by which the draft visions proposed by various stakeholders were apparently collected, and proposes to discuss these with “a larger group of stakeholders” before arriving at a broadly acceptable single vision (Pune CDP: 3). The various suggested ‘visions’ listed are once again interesting in terms of their apparent desire to focus on the basic needs of citizens² rather than the creation of high-priced showpiece infrastructure projects purported to attract foreign investment – such as some cities have suggested they would like to do. In the case of Pune and many other cities, though, this desire for inclusion does not go much further than the articulation of the vision for the city – it is not reflected in any particularly detailed proposals for the dramatic improvement of life in the city’s slums.

Chandigarh claims to offer “world-class services to its investors” (Chandigarh CDP: 2) and says that it wishes to “project Chandigarh as a Global City” (*ibid*: 10), but articulates a rather focussed and oddly limited formal vision statement that we are told incorporates a key word suggested by each stakeholder: “A beautiful eco-friendly city for all, providing 24x7 water supply” (*ibid*: 70).

Ludhiana reports that based on the “discussions with various stakeholders”, it was decided that ‘the City of Ludhiana’ would “become a leading economic centre of the country, and... [would provide the] best possible ‘Quality of Life’ to its citizens’. The CDP then lists “a set of actions aimed at transforming the city into an internationally competent urban area. This set of actions, again, articulates a careful balance: it includes “the supply of basic services at optimum levels for the entire city”, including the poor, and the provision of housing and services to the homeless and slum-dwellers on a “priority basis” (Ludhiana CDP: 2-13).

The **Jaipur** CDP declares that the “vision phrased by the citizens of Jaipur during the stakeholder workshop” was (for) “a vibrant, 21st century renaissance city”, and explains that this phrase “brings out clearly the need of the people to break out of the ordinary and to achieve an improved quality of life”. The document also lists other potential visions “expressed by the citizens during various meetings”: visions of the city as a “centre powered by technology”, a “heritage city” and more prosaically, a “garbage-free city” being among the many suggestions, reflecting the tension between the city’s desire to be unique but at the same time, to not miss the IT bus as the citizens view that as the way to the future (Jaipur CDP: 15-1). Jaipur then also expresses “sectoral visions” for each area of infrastructure, as many other cities have done.

² For instance, one ‘vision’ listed by an unidentified ‘stakeholder’ in the Pune CDP states that its desire is for a “city of its citizens with diverse economic opportunities, rich culture and access to services for Urban Poor” (Pune CDP: 3).

Lucknow's vision is articulated through a long, complex statement that includes all the stated aims of the JNNURM document in the form of an almost literal summary, and starkly reflects the anxiety that many of the cities that have submitted CDPs have revealed: the anxiety to be seen promoting the aims of the Mission while at the same time seeking to address core, basic infrastructural deficiencies that they experience on the ground. Such statements perhaps also struggle to reflect all the concerns of a multiplicity of stakeholders. The "core vision" for Lucknow states that the city wishes to be one "of the five most liveable cities in India where every citizen enjoys a high quality of life and access to basic services and amenities, and where local culture, crafts and heritage are preserved and promoted. A city with a dynamic economy driven by service sectors such as knowledge-based education, health, tourism and information technology that provides opportunities for all and makes it an attractive investment destination" (Lucknow CDP: 74). This document then also goes on to elaborate upon sectoral visions related to various areas of infrastructure provision in some very down-to-earth detail.

Indore provides a similar summary of the aims of the JNNURM statement: "Indore shall enter an era of Prosperity with (a) Spatially restructured environment, improved urban infrastructure to achieve (a) better lifestyle, minimum basic services (for) the underprivileged with functionally sustainable development and dynamism of growth which will pave the way (for it to become) a world class commercial city" (Indore CDP: 107). All the key catch-words and phrases are there in this statement. Like many other CDPs, this document then gets down to listing some very prosaic aims in terms of service provision to all its citizens (*ibid*: 108-111).

The Raipur CDP also articulates a desire to integrate "the poor and the destitute" into the "mainstream" and reduce disparity, and declares that the vision statement adopted for the city is for "a beautiful eco-friendly city for all, providing (a) high quality of civic services" (Raipur CDP: 79).

The "vision for **Coimbatore** city" is "to achieve improved service levels and (a) better quality of life for the citizens of Coimbatore", through the pursuit of a graded coverage of service provision in all the areas of infrastructure, including "pucca houses for all slum households" and "education for all in slums". The stated aim is to ensure 100 per cent coverage in most areas of infrastructure provision by the year 2026. The goals in each sector of service provision are generally modest, including the increase of road length and parking-space provision as part of the developments in the area of "traffic and transportation". High-priced, showpiece infrastructure projects are notably missing from this checklist (Coimbatore CDP: 5).

The **Guwahati** CDP explains that while the preparation of a vision is a "critical element" in the JNNURM process, Guwahati had already put together a vision statement for the Master Plan for the Guwahati Metropolitan Area 2025 that it felt articulated its position well: "Guwahati is visualised to be one of the most admired state capitals of India with a unique image. To this end, Guwahati shall promote and focus on balanced and sustainable economic and infrastructure growth that will enable the city to fulfil its role

as the Gateway to the North-East (of) India and South East Asia”. It then goes on to list the familiar line-up of sector-specific goals according to the JNNURM format, including, somewhat ominously, the statement that it aims to “create a city without slums” by rehabilitating existing slums and preventing further encroachment through enforcement (Guwahati CDP: 82).

Section conclusion and recommendations:

It is important to look at these stated visions, not only because so much effort appears to have been devoted to evolving them by each of the cities studied, but also because they are a reliable indication of the cities’ priorities - or at least the priorities that they wish to put out in the public domain.

The visions studied run from making no mention of the poor all, through the making of rather ominous statements about “getting rid of slums” to committing to improve the everyday lives of all classes of citizens, including the least fortunate. This patchiness of focus may again be related to the lack of clarity about the centrality of the urban poor to the development of JNNURM cities in the Mission document itself. Section IV of this paper will look more closely at the extent to which this last commitment to improving the lives of the urban poor has been backed up by concrete financial budgeting by the cities studied. Meanwhile, however, it is interesting to note that most of the cities included in this study are more concerned (or at least as concerned) with the improvement of the everyday lives of their middle-class citizens as they are with investing in big projects that are expected to stimulate their economies in the long run.

Policy-making fora would do well to take note of the fact that though the formulators of plans for various cities are aware of the national goal of creating “world-class” cities with high-value infrastructure projects that are expected to encourage international investment, they are even more keenly and painfully conscious of their continued inability to ensure acceptably modern levels of basic infrastructural support in the areas of water supply, power, public transport, sewage and garbage management. The obvious message seems to be that even in terms of ensuring satisfaction among a given city’s new-economy employees and, thus, their investor-employers, basic services may be ignored at the cities’ peril.

Section III

Listing of stakeholders in the consultative process and naming of the agencies involved in the actual preparation of the CDPs

Though all the CDPs mention the involvement of various stakeholders in the process of evolving their different sections, but especially their visions, many of them do not list these stakeholders specifically.

For instance, the **Hyderabad** CDP gives a brief, vague list of stakeholders consulted, including “Representatives of the poor communities” with no further details. However, this list is followed by a highlighted box framing the statement: “A key feature of consultations is (the) inclusion of... representatives from poor community groups such as Community Development Societies and Self-Help Groups in the entire process including the working groups”. We are further told that after the process of building “enthusiasm, understanding and commitment to the CDP”, a consensus was derived along with the stakeholders to firm up the process and get them to agree upon a structured programme to take the CDP forward (Hyderabad CDP: 5).

The document also explains that the Hyderabad CDP was prepared by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) and “other key stakeholders” and that it was “based on the City Development Strategy formulated earlier”, in 2003, by the MCH with the “support and assistance” of several organisations including the Cities Alliance and UN-HABITAT (*ibid*: 1-2).

Mumbai provides no details – or evidence – of any serious discussion of the Plan in its preparatory stages at all. One short section titled ‘Emerging City Development Strategy’ claims that the “Vision Mumbai and Task Force recommendations have been discussed at various fora and based on the consensus that has emerged, the (chosen) strategy for development has found favour and hence is proposed as the bedrock of the City Development Plan” (Mumbai CDP: 166). That is all there is on the subject of stakeholder involvement, apart from the discussion of the “highlights of the McKinsey study and the visioning exercise” that precedes the abovementioned section on the “emerging” CDP strategy (*ibid*: 143-166).

A careful reading of the Mumbai Plan suggests that it is really a compendium of many previous plans and vision documents, most notably the McKinsey document, and that the funds sought are sometimes for infrastructure projects that have been ongoing for close to two decades. It is not, of course, a bad idea to seek an injection of fresh, outside funds to help complete long-term projects that have perhaps been starved of funds, but it is important in such cases for project reviewers to look closely at what has been happening to these project areas over time before fresh funds are released. The Mumbai CDP also does not make a formal mention of who prepared it.

The **Bangalore** CDP has an entire chapter entitled “Stakeholder consultations and vision”, where it claims that “more than 50 stakeholder consultation workshops were conducted across the city during March and June 2006”, and that the profile of the stakeholders included “government agencies, ULBs, NGOs, elected representatives, trade associations and the public”, apart from “one-on-one meetings” with “prominent citizens” and “policy makers”. The Bangalore Mahanagar Palike and other government bodies were assisted in the process of carrying out “focussed consultations with user groups and citizens” by “certain NGOs such as Janaagraha” (Bangalore CDP Volume 1: 34).

Detailed minutes are provided for three of these “stakeholder consultation” meetings as annexures to Volume 3 of the Bangalore CDP. The first meeting includes two members of UrbanFirst Systems, the organisation that has prepared the Bangalore CDP, apart from eight representatives of the local and state governments at various levels. The second meeting reports 18 representatives of central, state and local governments, the two heads of UrbanFirst Systems, and four representatives of “NGOs” from Civic Bangalore, Avas and Mahila Milan. The third meeting minuted, which purports to report the discussion on the “draft report presentation” on the BSUP sub-mission, is again limited to government representatives, a consultant (Manasa Consultants) and UrbanFirst Systems (*ibid*: Volume 3: Annexures 1, 2, 3). Though there is no formal acknowledgement on the cover of the Bangalore CDP, the document does state that UrbanFirst Systems put together the sections covering both JNNURM sub-missions for the Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (*ibid*: Volume 3: 1).

The **Kolkatta** CDP, in a brief section titled “The Participatory-cum-Consultative Process”, talks of the inclusion of several elected and appointed members of government, as well as officers of the state service-delivery mechanism, at various levels of consultation. But there are no specific details of names, meetings or discussions. The participation of representatives of civil society is limited to a couple of references to the presence of “representatives of business/industries etc.” on the sectoral committees constituted to discuss the Plan (Kolkatta CDP: II-40A). Kolkatta also bases its sectoral plans under the JNNURM on an earlier 25-year perspective plan called Vision 2025, though no specifics about who prepared this “vision” document are provided, either (*ibid*: II-40A-C).

The **Chennai** CDP does not also go into any details of stakeholder consultations. The reason could be that the CDP acknowledges – as activists working in the area of urban development in Chennai point out – that the CDP was developed not through a separate, organic process, but by drawing from planning documents already available such as the proposed Master Plan for the Chennai Metropolitan Area which, we are told, was the result of “stakeholder participation at various stages” (Chennai CDP: 3). Several cities that already have or are in the process of preparing planning documents similar to the CDP have availed of the material put together for the former, which is not a problem in and of itself.* However, there should still have been some detailing of stakeholder involvement (in the earlier planning documents referred to, if not the current CDP itself)

that could have given one some idea about the forces that were guiding the preparation of the CDP. The formally acknowledged credit for the preparation of the Chennai CDP is to the Government of Tamil Nadu.

The **Ahmedabad** CDP, too, places itself as a milestone in an ongoing process of the formulation of a “city development strategy” that started in July 1999, with the organising of a workshop on “city visioning and strategy formulation” by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) and the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) with funds from the World Bank and the Australian Agency for International Development. The slum policy is based on consultations that took place in 2003; the “detailed project formulation” was developed between 2003 and 2005, and the “bus rapid transit project” was initiated on the basis of “technical workshops and stakeholder consultations” in October 2005 – all events that occurred before the formal announcement of the JNNURM. There is no indication of any stakeholder discussions related specifically to the seeking of JNNURM funds; even the abovementioned descriptions of previous consultations do not provide complete details or lists of stakeholders. All we are told is that several of these events were facilitated by the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT), which agency is also listed on the cover page as having provided the “technical support” for the preparation of the Ahmedabad CDP by the AMC and the AUDA (Ahmedabad CDP: 1-5).

Pune does provide details of three stakeholder meetings. The first one involving municipal officers also lists the names of the participating officials, and the third and apparently biggest meeting is minuted with a fair amount of detail, including a list of 68 participants. Though the majority of these participants are municipal or other government officials, there seems to be some representation from the local press, resident associations and environment groups, including a couple of ‘mohalla committees’.

The report of the second stakeholder meeting, which is somewhat oddly titled “Discussion with identified individual stakeholders”, minutes in the form of copious bullet-point lists what each of 30 stakeholders suggested in terms of areas of concern to be included in Pune’s CDP, but apparently deliberately chooses not to name any of them. No details of the time and place of this stakeholder meeting are provided in the CDP document, either. Many of the ideas reported from the discussion are, however, interesting. For one thing, several of these anonymous stakeholders have discussed the issue of rehousing slum-dwellers, and some have made innovative suggestions in this area. Stakeholder 16, for instance, suggests that slum-dwellers be offered options in terms of the location and plinth areas of their resettlement homes, with the additional suggestion that anyone who chooses to avail of extra plinth area may be charged on a no-profit-no-loss basis. Stakeholders 18 and 19, in a joint list have, on the other hand, simply suggested that there was a “need to tackle in-migration”, especially among the unskilled workforce, but have offered no details about how the city might follow up on this piece of advice.

The discussions held by these unnamed stakeholders on the subject of slum rehabilitation yield, among others, the suggestions that “vertical slum rehabilitation” is not a solution, that the area available to slum-dwellers needs to be increased from 3 per cent to 10 per cent of the total land area of the city, and that finance should be made available to slum-dwellers through micro-credit schemes that help ensure beneficiary contributions (Pune CDP: Annexures 1,2, 3, 4). It would have been interesting and meaningful to have been able to put names to each of these lists of suggestions. The Pune CDP does not formally state any authorship.

The **Chandigarh** CDP provides a good example of the practice employed by many cities, which imply that wide-ranging stakeholder consultations were held, but do not go on to provide any details or specifics on the basis of which one might be able to gauge the breadth or depth of the consultations undertaken. The Chandigarh CDP states that its vision statement was “outlined for the Municipal Corporation of Chandigarh involving the various stakeholders consisting of government departments, Municipal Corporation, councillors, representatives of NGOs and women representatives, civil society, business and trade, economics, media, the urban poor” (Chandigarh CDP: 70), but unless the names of the specific individuals and organisations involved are listed – even, perhaps, as an annexure – there is no way to fix accountability. The Chandigarh CDP merely claims to have been submitted by the Finance Secretary, Chandigarh Administration.

On the other hand, the **Ludhiana** CDP lists details of every meeting held to discuss the CDP, with minutes attributing various comments or suggestions to individuals, and thus makes a commendable effort to both indicate a reasonably consultative process and fix some accountability. There is not much reporting on discussions about the poor, though, apart from the mention that in a meeting between the municipal councillor, the mayor and some local industrialists, the latter expressed the desire that industrial parks be created for them by – among other things – the removal of slums (Ludhiana CDP: 2-1 – 2-13). In a personal acknowledgement at the start of the document, the Commissioner of the Ludhiana Municipal Corporation formally attributes the preparation of the CDP to the “team at Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana”.

The **Jaipur** CDP is another notable exception, in that it lists with exhaustive detail discussions held at a range of locations with 55 different groups, including 22 slums (the largest single category of stakeholders involved), various traders’ associations, some unions, NGOs, Resident Welfare Associations, groups of students at their schools, elected representatives including 22 city councillors (Jaipur CDP: Annexure 12-1: 1-2). There is also a report of a stakeholder workshop, with details of stakeholder comments and a complete list of the 60 participants in the workshop (there are some NGO representatives mentioned here, but none relating directly to work in urban slums - *ibid*: Annexure 1 to Annexure 12-59). There is an entire 25-page chapter replete with charts and photographs devoted to “Stakeholder Consultations” (*ibid*: 12-1 – 12-25). Many of these meetings are discussed in some detail (with accompanying photographs) in the above-mentioned annexure. The Jaipur CDP is attributed to the Department of Local Self Government, Government of Rajasthan, and the Jaipur Municipal Corporation.

Lucknow lists some of the stakeholders consulted, but apart from stating that a random sample of 320 individuals from slums were interviewed, no further details are provided. The Lucknow CDP, however, adds that any “actions to address services in slum areas would need to involve further consultations as part of the planning and implementation of interventions” (Lucknow CDP: 35). The Lucknow CDP is formally attributed to a consultant, Feedback Ventures; in this respect this document is unusual.

The **Indore** CDP again lists broad categories of stakeholders, including “Members of Parliament... and Other elected representatives” and the “City’s Community Planning Partners comprising of NGOs and CBOs” but does not tell us which specific individuals or groups were involved, and when and how they met to discuss the formulation of the CDP (Indore CDP: 5). A graphic representing the CDP preparation process has been sourced from the Coimbatore CDP. The Indore CDP document also mentions that it has put the plan on the corporation’s website, for access to the public, and that it will be revised regularly (*ibid*: 5-6). This document acknowledges that the CDP was prepared by Mehta and Associates, Architects and Planners; again, as in the case of the Lucknow CDP, such an acknowledgement is a rare one.

The rather voluminous **Raipur** CDP presents two single-page graphic abstractions describing what a consultative process ought to involve (Raipur CDP: 11, 179) but does not give details of who might have participated in such a process in the run-up to the preparation of the CDP. Annexure 1, titled ‘Reforms’, presents a series of photocopies of unsigned, hand-completed questionnaires, one for each focus area and each titled ‘Checklist of Reforms’. There is thus a questionnaire for ‘Internal Earmarking for Basic Services for Poor’ that has almost no responses beyond checks in relevant columns. One response suggests (by way of a ‘tick’ mark) that a “strategic document which outlines the requirements both physical and financial timeframes, sources of funding and implementation strategies for each of the services, including outlining convergences, if any’ will be ready in year 4 of the mission period (Raipur CDP Annexure 1: 26-26). The Raipur CDP states clearly on the cover page that it was prepared by the Operation Research Group in a “joint venture” with one ‘aarvee associates: architects, engineers, consultants’.

The equally bulky **Coimbatore** CDP provides details of two stakeholder meetings and one summary of the minutes of a meeting held by a private consultant on suggestions for infrastructure improvements in the neighbouring Tiruppur municipality. Of the two stakeholder meetings, one is an all-party meeting hosted by the Coimbatore mayor, that is reported on extensively in Tamil. The other meeting is reported to have been attended by “the MLAs of Coimbatore East and Singanallur, Ward committee chairmen, councillors, industrialists, officials of the Confederation of Indian Industry, Chamber of Commerce, educationalists, familiar NGOs”. There is a summary of their suggestions which does not include any specific reference to slums or their populations. There are, however, photographs provided of an apparently well-attended meeting and some of the suggestions made by individual stakeholders are printed alongside photographs of

the individuals making them. One of three suggestions attributed to a person identified next to a photograph as an NGO representative suggests the “provision of infrastructure facilities in slums” (Coimbatore CDP Appendix IV – Minutes of Stakeholder Meetings). Coimbatore attributes the preparation of the “City Corporate Plan”, a component of its overall CDP, to Wilbur Smith Associates with the support of the Tamilnadu Urban Development Fund (*ibid*: 2).

The **Guwahati** CDP provides some information about the meetings held, including summaries of five workshops. However, apart from participants from the government’s side, no details of exactly who represented the different interests is provided (Guwahati CDP: 7, 155-160). Details relating to the final workshop indicate that the CDP was put together by various branches of government at the local and state levels (*ibid*:160), but no specific acknowledgements are provided.

Section conclusion and recommendations:

The impression gained from most of the CDP documents is that there were no serious stakeholder consultations or discussions held, especially with regard to the services for the poor. This area of the process definitely needs strengthening to be meaningful. Many CDPs drew on existing or ongoing city plans or sought to fund already planned projects. * While there is nothing wrong with this, especially if the funds are being sought for significant but cash-starved projects, this reliance on existing plans cannot be substituted for exhaustive discussions with stakeholders from all sections of society – whether or not the CDP is a fresh, standalone document or one derived from similar, earlier plans.

Similarly, very few of the CDP documents actually tell us who put them together, even though informally acquired information would suggest that a majority of the CDPs were prepared by or with the help of outside institutions or private consultants. As pointed out above, smaller cities are more upfront about the process and source of CDP preparation than are bigger metros. **A formal requirement that the individuals, agencies or government departments that actually put together the CDP document be listed would again have helped to fix responsibility better.**

Section IV

Financial support sought under the JNNURM for the Sub-Mission on Basic Services for the Urban Poor

Though every CDP makes a less or more detailed mention of its commitments to the BSUP sub-mission, an analysis of the financial commitment it expects to make towards these services is a good indication of the real priorities of the city in question.

By budgeting a fourth of its Rs 20,000 crore seven-year proposal for JNNURM funds for “poverty reduction” programmes that span a range of efforts, **Hyderabad** is not doing too badly (Hyderabad CDP: 153).

Mumbai does not offer a full budgeting of programmes or the amounts it expects to access from JNNURM sources. It lists several “projects identified for implementation”, with the estimated costs and “indicative timeframes” mentioned for some of them. Under the category “Housing and Slum Development”, sums of Rs 5,000 crores and Rs 7,400 crores respectively have been budgeted for the reconstruction of cessed buildings and for the redevelopment of the Dharavi slum over the period 2006-2011. Under a third category – “Other slums in Mumbai (Slum-less Mumbai Project)”, the budget is listed as “to be determined”, and the timeframe column has a blank. At the end of the list, the document states that the city’s “priorities are extending beyond the above and the aforesaid projects should not be considered as the only priorities for Mumbai development. A comprehensive list of projects for Mumbai is being evolved as several studies are underway for projectization. These projects shall be updated on an annual basis in the CDP to reflect the prioritization”. Then, three projects, relating to storm-water drainage, water supply and sewage disposal respectively are further identified as “immediate projects” and around Rs 3,236 crores have been sought from JNNURM funds over an unstated time period. (The total time-frame for the completion of these three projects, as stated in another table, range from two to almost 20 years). Thus, from the Mumbai CDP, it is impossible to get a reasonably complete idea about what the city’s identified JNNURM projects might be, what the rough time-periods for their completion and their total costs might be, or what proportion of the total money received might be set aside for services to the poor (Mumbai CDP: 206-209).

Bangalore has proposed to budget for Rs 6,034 crores out of a total of Rs 22,534 crores during a budgetary period of 2006-2012 to the BSUP sub-mission (Bangalore CDP V I:133, V III:6.5), roughly 50 per cent of which it hopes to source from JNNURM funds. Bangalore also lists a ‘beneficiary contribution’ of Rs 749 crores over the plan period.

The Bangalore CDP, which demarcates a sharp divide between the two sub-missions under the JNNURM, that of the UIG and the BSUP, by arranging the sections in separate booklets, nevertheless provides some cross-referencing. For instance, when it discusses water-supply provision in its UIG booklet (Volume I), it makes a mention of the needs of the poor and directs the reader to Volume III, which focuses on the BSUP.

Kolkatta appears to already have two big slum-improvement projects going, with other sources of funding having been identified. One of them is the Development Plan for slums prepared by the Kolkatta Metropolitan Planning Committee, a 5-year slum-redevelopment project valued at nearly Rs 4,000 crores, 70 percent of which is to be secured as soft loans from financial institutions, and repaid through a combination of additional rent from the beneficiaries (25 percent), the commercial exploitation of land generated through the reorganisation of the slums being rebuilt (25 percent) and state budgetary support (50 percent). Interestingly, no part of this project is sought to be supported through JNNURM sources. There is also the Kolkatta Urban Services for the Poor project, a Rs 700-crore endeavour supported by the Department for International Development (DFID), UK, that aims to support urban planning and governance, improved access to urban services, and economic development in the identified slums (Kolkatta CDP: 36-38).

As far as the JNNURM coffers are concerned, the Kolkatta Metropolitan Development Authority is only seeking Rs 161.30 crores under the BSUP sub-mission for somewhat vaguely defined goals in the areas of “housing” and “other development works” (Kolkatta CDP: IV-7). This section does not even feature in the formal ‘City Investment Plan’ chapter of the CDP. The ‘City Investment Plan’ chapter lists a 5-year budget of Rs 6,939.00 crores for infrastructure projects, almost 40 percent of which are to go to the area of transport. Further, over a fourth of this transport component will be spent on 19 road bridges, flyovers, elevated roads and underpasses. The CDP is startlingly vague and thin on the subject of how much of this infrastructure budget will be sought to be supported by JNNURM funds, dealing with this entire issue in one short paragraph that says: “The [JNNURM] of the Government of India provides enormous opportunity for implementation of infrastructure development projects with a little over one-third assistance to be received from [GOI]. 57 projects out of an initial 109 projects have already been identified for posing under JNNURM that would extend over a seven-year period. Out of these, 15 projects have been shortlisted as priority ones for immediate assistance under JNNURM” (Kolkatta CDP: V-14).

Chennai has detailed break-ups in terms of budgetary provisions, and incorporates the discussion and identifiably independent budgeting of services for the poor within the overall discussion of each sector of service provision (such as water supply, transport,

and so on) for the entire population, instead of isolating services for the poor in a separate section on BSUP – something that the Toolkit and, indeed, the JNNURM premise itself, does not by its very definition require. Again, this break-up has been possible because of the prior existence of a detailed master plan document. This apart, there is a separate budget of Rs 3,887.23 crores for the BSUP component (which includes provision for additional infrastructural requirements for the poor, including housing), out of a budget of Rs 34,492.92 crores for a seven-year period. Details of how of these amounts are expected to be received from JNNURM sources year on year are also provided (Chennai CDP).

Ahmedabad's investment plans are rather sketchy and vague: a sum of Rs 994.3 crores out of a total budget of Rs 7,620.6 crores for an ill-defined “seven-year period” has been budgeted for “urban poor housing and slums”, but there are no clear details of what the expectation is from JNNURM sources (Ahmedabad CDP: 135).

The **Pune** CDP's funding allotment details are confusing: the detailed allotments are made on the basis of an estimate of Rs 6,349 crores for aggregate funding in all areas of service provision over the period 2006-2013 (Rs 1,590 crores of which are for “urban poor/ slums”), while the funding pattern that details the demands made from JNNURM sources do not give detailed break-ups and are calculated on a total investment budget of Rs 8,037 crores, which sum is listed as being at “current prices” (Pune CDP: 81-94).

Out of a total budgetary projection of Rs 1,468.14 crores for a period ranging from 2006 to 2036, the **Chandigarh** administration has requested a contribution of Rs 1,174.52 from the JNNURM coffers. Of this amount, only a sum of Rs 1.25 crore budgeted for in the first budget period of 2006-2011 is for an identifiable service for the poor (in this case, the upgradation of water supply). The CDP document makes various grandiose-sounding but vaguely articulated pronouncements about its desires and aims in the area of service-provision for the poor, but does not appear to wish to make a meaningful financial commitment in this area (Chandigarh CDP: 123-128).

Ludhiana proposes to spend almost Rs 4,000.00 crores on various projects over a six-year period from 2006 onwards, around Rs 2,053.00 of which has been sought from JNNURM funds. In the case of the BSUP component, Rs 166.65 crores have been requested from Mission sources, while a further Rs 56.00 crores are expected to be raised through “other grants/ government agencies” (Ludhiana CDP: 12-2).

And in **Jaipur**, the BSUP component is budgeted at a little over Rs 200.00 crores, or around 4.5 percent, of the total investment of Rs 4,400 crores budgeted for projects inspired by the JNNURM. Seventy percent of the money for the UIG component is expected from JNNURM funds and state-level funding, while the entire money for the BSUP projects will come from various levels of the state, including the JNNURM kitty (Jaipur CDP: 17-4, Annexure to 17-2).

Lucknow has projected a total investment of Rs 11, 856 crores for both sub-missions as well as a technical assistance/ capacity building component over two six-year phases. Out of this amount, Rs 4,845.00 is sought from JNNURM funds for work proposed under Phase-I, and further, Rs 1050.50 crores - or around 22 percent of the money sought from JNNURM sources for Phase-I - is to be set aside for the BSUP sub-mission (Lucknow CDP: 105-106).

For the seven-year period between 2005 and 2012, **Indore** has budgeted a total financial outlay of Rs 2,745 crores for various projects, out of which it would like to receive Rs 1,370 crores from JNNURM funds. It further expects to receive Rs 370 crores for the BSUP component (amounting to 70 per cent of the city's BSUP budget, or 27 per cent of the total amount demanded from JNNURM funds) from JNNURM sources over the period between 2005 and 2012 (Indore CDP: 169-170, along with the annexed table).

Raipur has budgeted Rs 232 crores (19.12 per cent) out of a total of Rs 1,213.62 for slum rehabilitation over a 7-year period, but has not specified how much it expects from JNNURM funds; this amount will presumably be on the basis of the percentages prescribed in the mission document (Raipur CDP: 168).

Coimbatore has budgeted Rs 403.36 crores out of a total of Rs 3,186 crores (12.6 per cent) for urban basic services for the poor. Of this amount, Rs 281.5 crores are for housing and the rest is to be spread over various forms of infrastructure provision for the poor. Seventy-five per cent of the total amount is expected from JNNURM funds provided from Central and state government sources for BSUP projects over a seven-year period between 2006 and 2012 (Coimbatore CDP: 133-164).

Guwahati, again, is seeking Rs 2,880.00 crores from the government, out of a total budget of Rs 3,200 crores, presumably over a 7-year period, though this period is not clearly defined. Out of the total budget estimate, only a little under 4 per cent - or Rs 110 crores - has been set aside for the BSUP component, and the proportion of this that will be sought from JNNURM funds is not specified, though we are told in general terms that 90 percent of the total costs under all heads will be sought from JNNURM sources (Guwahati CDP: 120, 147).

Section conclusion and recommendations:

Exact comparisons of funding patterns across cities are not possible or even necessary or fair to make, not only because of technical differences (for instance, different cities have interpreted the calendar terms and funding break-ups suggested under the Mission document in different ways). The cities are also all of different sizes and at different stages of growth, development and maturity in terms of government structure (for instance, Raipur has only recently emerged as a state capital).

However, one may view each city's CDP against some general parameters that include its level of seriousness about the provision of services for the poor as gauged by the depth and clarity project formulation, as well as the extent of the financial commitment made. **In this respect, there are some very clear trends that are evident: for instance, the funds allocated for the BSUP component typically form a very small component of the total budget in the case of most cities.** Most CDPs simply reflect the unstated bias of the JNNURM document itself, which clearly attributes more value to the UIG sub-mission than to the BSUP one.

However, some cities have chosen to view the artificially imposed divide between the two sub-missions less rigidly, and have blended details about infrastructural services to the poor into both sub-missions. But if most CDPs have chosen to maintain the division, and to further focus much of the BSUP component on the improvement of housing stock, they are merely responding to the confusion created by the JNNURM document itself. **The development of urban infrastructure cannot make a meaningful difference to our cities if the needs of all sections of society are not adequately or collectively addressed.**

Section V

Evidence of details about shelter and infrastructure provision for the poor; public-private partnership initiatives suggested; details of user charges and support/credit offered in cases where beneficiary participation is required; details of convergence between relocation schemes and employment/ infrastructure provision

The cities tend to be very varied in terms of their proposals for housing and basic-service provision for the poor. Some themes do run through most proposals, for instance the idea that the poor can and must pay, either in terms of part payment for the rebuilding or relocation of their homes, and/or for basic civic services like water and electricity supply, sewage and solid-waste disposal.

The **Hyderabad** CDP lists several central, state and local initiatives in the areas of housing, job and service provision for the poor that are ongoing, and discusses some recent developments in these areas. One state government initiative has been to offer below-poverty-line (BPL) families water-supply connections at Rs 1,200 each; another involves a “new citizen friendly street vendor policy” that has not been elaborated upon. A policy of “spending 40 % of net municipal funds for the improvement of slums” is said to be ongoing. Other plans involve the notification of un-notified slums and slum improvement on the basis of a “prioritised matrix approach”. The CDP repeatedly laments the lack of convergence between various government agencies and “civil society” in terms of poverty-reduction, and declares the “need to bring all these effort under a single authority to facilitate coordination and convergence and to avoid duplication of efforts and resources” but does not go into details about how this might be done. There is no discussion of convergence between programmes that relocate the poor and those that offer livelihood or infrastructure support (Hyderabad CDP: 70-74). The CDP reports the application of the principle of “users pay, beneficiaries pay, and polluters pay” over the six years prior to the preparation of the document, whereby door-step collection is offered and user charges to the tune of Rs 2 crores are being

collected from bulk-garbage generators such as hotels, restaurants, function halls, hospitals, markets and commercial centres (*ibid*: 51).

Mumbai proposes the construction of over one million new low-income category houses, as well as 800,000 houses to rehabilitate slum-dwellers under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, with incentives for private, NGO or community-based developers as well as user charges built into the programmes. Interestingly, Mumbai also suggests the construction of ‘special housing zones’ with rents of Rs 750.00- Rs 1,500.00. All basic services will be improved through community participation and charged for. There are no specific forms of credit offered to help the poor pay for their portion of any redevelopment activities; it is just hoped that some cushioning will be provided by NGOs and the private sector in return for benefits in terms of land development privileges. Though there are proposals to remove both industry and the poor to the urban periphery, there is no indication that these two activities are planned in tandem so as to provide those who are to be resettled with employment opportunities or supporting infrastructure.

The **Bangalore** CDP states that a survey carried out by the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board “and their consultants” located 542 slums and a little over 200,000 households as being in need of redevelopment, which task the city proposes to carry out with JNNURM funds. As mentioned earlier, one of Bangalore’s vision statements is “no more new slums”; the government “after careful consideration wishes to (re)develop all existing slums in Bangalore within a period of 15 years”, and to link this redevelopment with the offer of security of tenure at “affordable prices”. Further, in a section titled “How to prevent creation of new slums?” the Bangalore CDP recommends, among other things, the “adoption of state legislation by which at least 20 percent of the developed land in all housing projects” motivated by public and as well as private agencies is earmarked for the economically weaker section and low-income group categories. It would be interesting to see if such legislation is in fact carried through.

All services are expected to be paid for, but there are provisions for costs to be subsidised in various ways for the poor. For instance, the rebuilding of housing for the poor will be on the basis of benefits to the developer, who will be allowed to develop 50 percent of the land at market rates. Employers will be expected to share in the cost of infrastructure provision; sewerage and water-provision services will be paid for by the government for five years, after which they will be funded through “capital programmes”. There is a token statement of synergy through a promise that efforts will be made to rehouse the poor near their workplaces. Another recommendation is to review the housing finance system, including the access of the poor to credit and targeted subsidies for housing. It is also mentioned that PPP models for slum redevelopment could be explored in certain areas of the city where the slums are located close to major business enterprises (Bangalore CDP Volume III: 4.2-6.5). Elsewhere, multi-storied constructions that might include a mix of residential and commercial units as PPP models for slum redevelopment are also mentioned (*ibid*: 9); these proposals

need to be reviewed in light of the negative experiences reported by early multi-storeyed slum-redevelopment projects such as the so-called “Mumbai model”.

In the area of other infrastructural services for the poor, the Bangalore CDP includes the offering of improved water supply and sanitation services and the ensuring of delivery through convergence with other “already existing universal services of the government for education, health and social security”. The CDP also proposes the creation of “secure effective linkages between asset creation and asset management so that (such services, once set up) are not only maintained efficiently but also become self-sustaining over time”. The CDP further proposes that “institutionalising citizen participation in local decision-making will ensure equitable outcomes” and observes that bringing services such as water supply and sanitation to all under the city’s formal control will ensure that the poor do not actually end up paying more for these services, as they often do when they have illegal connections (*ibid*: 5.5). However, despite repeated mention of the desirability of the participation of the poor in various service-upgradation activities, no exact figures or percentages detailing the desired levels of their involvement are mentioned.

Kolkatta would like to focus on issues of land tenure and security of tenure for slum-dwellers, as also on “sustained initiatives on the generation of awareness regarding appropriate use of infrastructure and services as well as the prevention and misuse thereof” as measures that will be “extremely important for cost effective service delivery”. There is a proposal for notifying all lands occupied by slums under a tenancy act and then redeveloping them for slum-dwellers under various existing national programmes. It is suggested that for “debt servicing, enhanced rent may be collected from beneficiaries and the same used for the purpose” with “necessary government support”. “The need for devising mechanisms for the involvement of beneficiaries through community-based organisations, particularly the community development societies (CDS) formed under the SJSRY programme, in the planning, prioritising and implementation of slum development programmes” and, further, the contracting out of some of these slum development initiatives to the CDS so as to sustain their interest in the programme, has been flagged, though no details or expected timeline for such projects has been provided. It has, however, been mentioned that community contracting through these CDS has already been introduced in several areas, with the aim that this interesting form of contracting will become compulsory over time.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, a five-year Action Plan for the redevelopment of housing that will cover 90 per cent of the city’s slum-dwellers, based on an average unit cost of Rs 80,000, has been discussed, with the suggestion that the beneficiaries pay 25 per cent of the cost as rent, another 25 percent be generated through the commercial exploitation of land, and that the rest come from state budgetary support. (Kolkatta CDP: II-35 – 40).

Infrastructure development through private-sector participation is already underway in Kolkatta further to the notification of the “State government policy on Infrastructure

Development through Private Public partnerships” of 2003, and is strongly recommended for further promotion (*ibid*: III-10). There are various mentions through the Kolkatta CDP about the need to provide slum-dwellers support in the form of health, education and employment initiatives. There is no specific mention of convergence between these various areas of development; however, the Kolkatta plan also focuses on in situ redevelopment, not the relocating of slums to distant locations.

Chennai also places a great deal of emphasis on the coming together of the public, private and cooperative sectors to take care of service delivery, especially for the poor. Like many of the other cities studied, Chennai also plans to have a slum-free city, but in this case, through the construction of subsidised housing in advance to avoid the problems of rehabilitation. The Tamilnadu Slum Clearance Board proposes to construct almost 80,000 tenements at a cost of Rs 1,320.00 crores, and also to arrange with HUDCO to provide upto 65 percent of the cost through a hire-purchase scheme. The houses, which will come with assured land tenure in the case of Chennai, could be either single- or multi-storeyed (the multi-storey model is repeated here, and as mentioned elsewhere, needs to be approached with caution and further to the review of existing multi-storey models). Other slum-improvement schemes are also discussed, such as the provision of enhanced water-supply and toilet facilities – the proposal is to provide one stand-pipe, one bath and one toilet facility for every 10 households. Again, slum-dwellers will be expected to pay for water on a scale of subsidisation based on affordability criteria.

In an unusual instance of convergence between different programmes, the Chennai CDP also proposes to ensure the availability of health, education, recreation, community and neighbourhood facilities near slum redevelopment or resettlement sites, and further, proposes to incorporate the Nehru Rozgar Yojana as a means of injecting funds into projects involving shelter upgradation. It remains to be seen if such a model of convergence is successfully implemented and if successful, is replicated elsewhere.

Ahmedabad has one of the most developed proposals in terms of housing for the poor. It proposes a massive reconstruction programme for 1,34,000 ‘*chawls*’ (makeshift housing originally built for industrial workers), for which the beneficiaries will be expected to contribute 50 percent of the cost and the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation the rest. There are also proposals for slum upgradation in situ wherever possible. However, the beneficiaries of such upgradation projects will only be assured that they will not be removed for a period of 10 years – no permanent promises of tenure will be made to them. And those whose homes fall in the way of developmental projects will be removed to townships on the periphery of the city. Several of these ideas resonate through many of the CDPs: beneficiary participation in the reconstruction of homes, uncertain offers in terms of tenure, the removal of the poor to urban peripheries, with or without the accompanying creation of livelihood opportunities.

There are also proposals in the Ahmedabad CDP for the provision of basic services, including the ‘slum networking project’ that will aim to improve the physical as well as the community and social infrastructure available to slum-dwellers. Again, the

beneficiaries will have to pay for these services: the catchphrase is that slum-dwellers will become “partners not beneficiaries”. For instance, the slum networking project will require the slum-dweller “partners” to pay Rs 2,000.00 each, an industry partner will pay another Rs 2,000.00 and the local NGO Rs 500.00 per person, while the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation will absorb the rest of the cost.

The suggestion in many of these instances is that slum-dwellers do not currently pay to avail of civic services, which could not be further from the truth. A further suggestion made by the Ahmedabad and other CDPs is that while existing slums will be supported and improved, no new slums will be allowed to develop. In the absence of jobs that provide acceptable levels of support in the areas from which migrants move to these cities, and also in the absence of any meaningful plans for job provision in the cities themselves, simply stating that no new slums will be allowed to develop is at best wishful thinking, and otherwise merely a recipe for meaningless and repetitive violence on the urban poor.

Pune also has a fairly well-developed proposal for the rehousing of slum-dwellers, in which below-poverty-line slum home-owners who can prove continuous residence since before 1995 (as per the Maharashtra government’s policy on ‘regularisation’) will get subsidies of Rs 50,000.00 each to rebuild their houses under the Valmiki-Ambedkar Awas Yojana. In other areas, developers will be permitted to undertake slum rehabilitation schemes with 10 percent contributions from the beneficiaries (whose consent will not be required for the redevelopment to proceed), and the benefit of a higher floor-space index (buildable capacity per unit of land) for the developer concerned. The Pune Municipal Corporation also proposes to build paid-toilet schemes for the poor. Thus, PPP and user-fee schemes are both in evidence in the Pune CDP.

Chandigarh does not go into too much detail in terms of the BSUP section, but it does promise 100 percent metered water to all its residents, with an unspecified “rationalisation” of user charges for the poor. It further proposes to provide housing stock for ‘notified’ slums, though the rest will not be covered.

Ludhiana also proposes to include public-private participation in its efforts to provide 100 percent water supply to all its residents, and to recover costs through some form of user-charges. There are various proposals for slum upgradation and relocation, with 50 percent of the cost to be borne by beneficiaries relocated from government land. There is no mention of credit facilities for home-building or upgradation, or of synergy between living, working and community spaces in cases of resettlement.

The **Jaipur** CDP actually has details of even minor proposals for infrastructure development in each of its slums, along with budget details, suggesting that some thinking went into the preparation of these development plans. There are plans for the redevelopment of slums in situ except where the land is considered “sensitive” - such as in forest and flood-prone areas, as well as areas covered by the master plan. However, it

is also mentioned elsewhere in the same document that most slums are located in precisely such locations.

The policy to be followed in Jaipur for the redevelopment of slums and housing for the relatively poor is the Rajasthan Urban Housing and Habitat Policy of 2006. This policy is quite wide-ranging, encompassing as it does the setting up of a “single window system to resolve all slum development issues”, the encouraging of slum (re)development through the participation of cooperative societies in activities like the maintenance of common facilities and the paying of lease charges; infrastructure development through land-pooling arrangements that will involve a familiar model: that of constructing multi-storey housing on existing slum sites to minimise the problems of relocation and also to attract private developers who will provide housing free of cost in return for the freed-up part of the land. Further, this plan proposes the reservation of land for the economically-weaker sections and lower-income group members of the city’s population in each local plan, and the provision of affordable serviced land to the poor. Builders and developers are to be “encouraged to provide housing stock for rental accommodation”, though details about how this goal might be achieved have not been given. NGOs and consultants are to be roped in to train the poor to develop low-cost and cost-effective housing and infrastructure. (Jaipur CDP: 6-7- 8).

The **Lucknow** CDP quotes an Oxfam slum survey and claims that the city has already targeted 100 slums for in situ redevelopment. Further, it reports that 320 randomly chosen slum-dwellers (from all categories of slums according to tenure status) were interviewed before the slum policy for the CDP was developed. The CDP details the construction of several hundred houses for the poor under various national schemes. Slum-dwellers are also reported to be willing to pay for all the major infrastructural services. The document says they are willing to pay 10 per cent of the capital costs for new water-supply facilities and to provide free labour; several were already paying Rs 600 a year as “water tax” and were happy doing so. Similarly, they were willing to pay for sewerage services; the payment options including a flat rate for each connection, a one-time charge of Rs 200, or a graded charge related to property size. The slum-dwellers also demanded land-tenure rights, and said they were willing to pay up to Rs 100 a month for all the basic services combined, as well as Rs 300-500 as instalments on housing development and maintenance, based on their relative incomes and the tenancy status of the housing. The document reports a request from the interviewed slum-dwellers that EWS members not be relocated more than 5 km away from their workplaces, and that their new housing have all the necessary infrastructure prior to occupation and be linked to workplaces through a highly subsidised and regular transport system. These ideas are, however, not developed in terms of timelines or funding details (Lucknow CDP 32-40).

Indore’s goal, as articulated in the CDP, is to achieve a “zero slum city” by the year 2012, with the “rehabilitation and relocation of as many as 15,000 slum dwelling units in a phased manner”. The CDP claims that there is a housing shortage of about 40 per cent in Indore, most of which is in the slums. While there have been many slum

improvement projects carried out in Indore, including the much-publicised Indore Habitat Improvement Project, the CDP concedes that one major reason that these projects did not achieve much was that the beneficiaries were not included in the process of planning or implementing them. There have also been initiatives under the Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana, which have had limited successes.

Indore's proposed slum redevelopment plans include providing clear titles to land, preparing a baseline survey of available infrastructural facilities that could form the basis for future service provision, the rehabilitation of individual housing units in slums either in situ or at new locations with the provision of all necessary infrastructure in newly built three-storey structures. These redevelopments will follow the familiar PPP model wherein some of the original land area will be set aside for commercial development. The scheme "is expected to generate around Rs 25 crores from the year 2007-08 in a phased manner", and some 15 per cent of the total cost of this rehabilitation project will also be recovered from the beneficiaries. There is no mention of any offers of credit or other support to these beneficiary slum-dwellers. There is a proposal for the development of educational and health centres, as also "training programmes to maintain the created infrastructure and services". And finally, several "illegal colonies" that have sprung up in and around the city will be regularised and developed. While Rs 100 crores have been budgeted for this last activity under JNNURM funds, the beneficiaries will be charged Rs 15 per square foot, which levy is expected to generate a total of almost Rs 26 crores over a five-year period from 2006-07 to 2011-12 (Indore CDP: 137-138; 167-168).

Raipur promises the poor tenurial security and affordable housing through PPP. It proposes the relocation of slums located in "hazardous and vulnerable" areas. The CDP suggests that the provision of land tenure would enable slum-dwellers to access housing finance. The document proposes the provision of community halls and basic services including both physical and social infrastructure to slum-dwellers, and suggests that civil society be actively associated with "poverty programmes". This last idea is developed further: it is proposed that resident-welfare associations be formed and that the community participate through them in the design, implementation and management of slum improvement and housing projects. The document also adds that Raipur already has a long history of community-based organisations, including resident-welfare associations and mahila mandals, which participate in such activities. The privatisation of water services, including the provision of new connections to BPL families at the cost of Rs 1,200.00, to be paid in 12 instalments, is suggested for slum-dwellers. The document laments the lack of convergence between programmes and of coordination between institutions, and cites these shortcomings as being major challenges for the "effective implementation of poverty programmes", but does not offer any suggestions as to how these problems might be overcome (Raipur CDP: 74-77).

The **Coimbatore** CDP states that 80 per cent of the city's slums are pucca structures; that 60 per cent of these have tiled roofs over brick walls and that the remaining ones have tiled roofs over concrete walls, but less than five per cent have piped water and very few

have access to toilet and sewerage facilities (Coimbatore CDP 92-94). The city proposes to “rehabilitate” slum-dwellers who are currently living in unauthorised locations to a fresh, “identified” location with infrastructure provided; over 28,000 houses are proposed to be rebuilt or resettled under this programme (*ibid*:131). Local communities are encouraged to avail of benefits provided under various slum development programs by developing linkages with lead bankers. There is a lot of discussion of community involvement in learning about sanitation and environment issues. Various increments to infrastructure provision for the slums are discussed. The decentralisation of waste processing is discussed as a means of augmenting household income and as an informal economic activity to be supported, as it is in other cities, and again, this is an area – as in other cities – in which PPP and NGO involvement are discussed (*ibid*: 91, 112,147).

“Slums need to be located outside the cities to improve the sanitary conditions of the cities” says the **Guwahati** CDP (Guwahati CDP: 118). A comprehensive slum improvement programme is proposed in the CDP. This programme will provide “shelter and other physical infrastructure at affordable prices so as to improve the sanitation and living conditions in the existing slums and other squatter settlements”; provide “adequate health care” and help develop facilities for community development and recreation, basic education and training, and the maintenance and upgradation of existing housing stock in the poorer sections of the city (*ibid*: 70-71). The city proposes to construct community baths and toilets and child-care centres to support these relocations, but there is no discussion of the need for employment options to be available at these faraway locations. Other schemes for the poor include night shelters, homes for the old and for destitute children (*ibid*:118-120). There is a proposal to earmark at least 25 percent of developed land in all housing projects, public as well as private, for the EWS and lower-income group categories, with a system of cross-subsidisation. PPP is mentioned several times, especially in the context of parking facilities, water-supply and solid-waste disposal, but most of all, it is discussed as being desirable under the JNNURM norms (*ibid*: 97, 106, 127, 144).

Section conclusion and recommendations:

The underlying themes are clear: increasing privatisation and ‘partnerships’ between the private, the non-governmental, and the public sectors; the enforcement of universal charges for civic services, but not necessarily the provision of credit, livelihood opportunities or support services that would make the increasing presence of market forces supportable for poor ‘beneficiaries’ of BSUP schemes.

Again, this is an area that needs to be discussed and spelled out very clearly in the Toolkit. It is a fact that the urban poor already pay for all their infrastructural and support services, that their payments go into the illegal economy when their residential status is itself fundamentally precarious legally, and that they therefore

often end up paying very much more per unit (for typically poor and unsafe qualities of service) than the middle classes do. Therefore, many of them are quite willing to access services through a formalised system where they pay reasonable charges to the state for reasonable levels of service provision. However, unless there is a convergence between employment, residential, infrastructural and financial support programmes for the poor, the overall aims of the JNNURM area unlikely to be fulfilled.

Governance

Most CDPs provide fairly detailed descriptions of their governance structures, but seem to find themselves unable to incorporate the JNNURM's e-governance requirements beyond token mentions.

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