


A People's Housing Policy

[Final Draft for Discussion]



HAZARDS CENTRE
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Section I - Introduction

The search for a solution to housing Delhi's poor and shelterless has acquired a new edge in the past year with both the Union Government as well as the State Government (GNCTD) being seized of the matter [see "*HC directive on slums' removal*", *The Hindu, New Delhi, 28.09.2002*]. Apart from the standard strategies of improvement, upgradation, and relocation, the governments are now also seeking private sector and NGO (non-government organisation) participation in building low-cost housing [see "*Slum relocation remains an uphill task*", *The Hindu, New Delhi, 21.09.2002*]. There is also some talk of participation by the poor themselves and many of these features have been incorporated into the Draft National Slum Policy. However, there have been no substantive measures taken to provide actual administrative and organisational avenues for such participation.

This monograph is an attempt to look at the problem in historical perspective and to suggest an alternative solution based on lessons learnt from past experiences. The growth of slums and sub-standard housing in Delhi is analysed in the context of the opportunities for work that the city offers without sufficient provenance for land, housing, and services. Government policies that have evolved over the years, to make up the deficit, are examined in terms of their performance and coherence. Some case studies are then taken up of specific settlements to understand what is the potential for their re-housing. All these lessons are then brought together to posit an alternative housing policy.

This monograph has been prepared by the Hazards Centre on behalf of the Sajha Manch, an alliance of over forty organisations working with the city's poor, formed in 1999. What gives it internal strength is the range of experiences and capabilities available within the alliance. Thus, the Sajha Manch not only has representatives of slum clusters and resettlement colonies as well as unauthorised colonies, but also professional groups with organisational and technical skills. While some of the data that forms the basis for this monograph has been accessed from government records and publications, a significant portion has been collected from (and discussed within) communities by the constituent members of the Sajha Manch. Hence, this alternative policy formulation can well lay claim to being a genuinely participatory "people's" view.

Section II - Delhi's Slum Population

Delhi is one of the fastest growing cities in India, with a current population growth of 5 to 6 lakhs every year. More than 2.5 lakh migrants are believed to pour into Delhi every year in search of employment opportunities. The population of NCT (National Capital Territory) of Delhi in 1999 was around 134.2 lakhs [ref – *Delhi 1999 A Fact Sheet, NCRPB*]. According to the Slum Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), in 1999 there were over 1,100 slum clusters with an estimated population of 30 lakhs [ref – *ALMITRA H. PATEL & OTHERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS, page 4*]. It has been estimated that as much as 77% of the entire population, i.e. more than 103 lakhs, is living in marginal/sub-standard settlements (see Table 1). Estimates by the Delhi Urban Environment and Infrastructure Improvement Project give some widely differing figures of the break-up but the proportion in sub-standard shelter is still over 75%.

Table 1: Urban Settlement Pattern in 1999-2000

Category	No. of Settlements	Population (in lakhs)	Percentage to Total Population	Population as per DUEIIP
Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters	1160	32.0	23.84	20.72
Resettlement Colonies	52	20.0	14.90	17.76
Unauthorised Colonies	1500	35.0	26.08	25.16
Urban Villages	216	6.0	4.47	8.88
Notified Slum Areas	-	9.5	7.08	26.64
Shelterless	-	0.6	0.44	-
Planned Colonies		29.2	23.18	33.08
TOTAL	-	132.3	100.00	132.34

Sources :

- i. Reports on Slums in Delhi, Slum & JJ Deptt, MCD, 1994.
- ii. Evaluation of Slum Upgradation Strategies in Delhi', (2001), Pravesh Siroha, Unpublished Thesis, SPA, New Delhi
- iii. Economic Survey of Delhi 2001-2002
- iv. DUEIP, Status Report for Delhi 21, GOI & MoE&F, January 2001, page 1, chapter 7.

According to census reports, the slum population in Delhi in 1951 was only 63,745 and increased to 12,96,720 by 1991 (Table 2). There was a steep plunge in the number of JJC (Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters) from 1,124 to 290 between 1971 and 1981, which was occasioned by the massive demolitions and relocations during the Emergency. But by 1999 the number of clusters had climbed back to 1,160. In other words, the increase in the slum population has continued unabated while the number of clusters dropped momentarily in 1975-77. Thus the density of population in the squatter settlements has increased significantly. There must, therefore, be underlying reasons why the slum population continues to grow within the city and

why drastic relocations, as during the period of the Emergency in 1975-76, have not been able to stop this growth.

Table 2: Growth of Squatter Settlements

Year	No. of JJ Clusters	No. of Jhuggies	Population	Growth Rate (%)
1951	199	12,749	63,745	-
1961	544	42,815	2,14,075	235.83
1971	1124	62,594	3,12,970	46.19
1981	290	98,709	4,93,545	57.69
1991	929	2,59,344	12,96,720	162.74
1994	1080	4,80,929	23,40,645	80.51
1997*	1100	6,00,000	30,00,000	-
1999*	1160	6,00,000	32,00,000	-

estimates

Sources:

- i. Annexure-I, ALMITRA H. PATEL & OTHERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
- ii. Society For Development Studies & High Level Committee on Unauthorised Colonies
- iii. Delhi 1999 - A Fact Sheet, NCRPB, page 20

Section III - Housing Shortage

Why do people live in slums? The answer has much to do with the availability of accessible and affordable housing. In 1956, the *Bharat Sewak Sangh* had conducted a survey of slums in old Delhi and found a population of 2.25 lakhs (out of a total of 9.51 lakhs, i.e. 23.7%) living in 1787 slum clusters. As against this, a government survey in the 60s estimated only 4.4% of the population were living in slums [ref – *Alternative Report for The CESCRC on evictions and Housing Rights, Rajeev John George, Indore, December 2002*]. Hence, the First Master Plan (MPD-62) allocated only 5% of the land to housing the Economic Weaker Section (EWS). Even this allocation was never made available to the working poor, resulting in further proliferation of slums. The MPD-62 had envisaged construction of 7.4 lakh Dwelling Units (DUs) from 1961 to 1981, but only 5.43 lakh DUs were available at the end of this period.

Urban Delhi accommodated about 11.5 lakh households in different housing developments in 1981. Housing shortage at the beginning of the Second Plan (MPD-2001) period (1981) had been estimated at about 3 lakh DUs which included (i) squatters and shelterless, (ii) families sharing houses in the congested built-up areas, (iii) houses requiring immediate replacement. So the planners estimated that 16.2 lakh new DUs would be required in the period 1981-2001 as shown in Table 3. Of these houses, 43% would be built by the housing agencies (such as Delhi Development Authority – DDA) and co-operatives, 25% would be constructed by individuals on site and service plots, and 17% would be by individual families on individual plots [ref – *MPD 2001, DDA, August 1990, Page 5-6*].

Table 3: Housing to be Built 1981-2001

Period	New housing required	Average per year
1981-86	323,000	65,000
1986-91	379,000	76,000
1991-96	434,000	87,000
1996-2001	483,000	97,000
Total	1,619,000	81,000

Source: MPD-2001, DDA, August 1990, Page 5

Table 4 indicates the actual housing development in Delhi until 1995. This indicates that for the period of the Second Master Plan (1981-2001), in fact DDA was able to provide land and housing for only 5,56,360 DUs – or roughly 34% of target. Of this greatly reduced number, DDA and co-operatives (42.5%) met their share of 43% and the site and services plots offered for resettlement (23.9%) corresponded to the 25% norm, but the allotment of plots for individual families (31.7%) significantly exceeded

the 17% provision. These figures indicate that the actual allotment of housing, while being one-third of requirement, was also heavily biased in favour of those who could afford to pay for high-cost shelter. The land distribution records show that 47% of the land is occupied by higher income groups (HIG) and only 21 % by lower income groups (LIG).

Table 4: Development of Housing

	to 1971	1971-81	1981-91	1991-95	Total	%
DDA Flats	5,600	60,000	1,29,000	57,000	2,51,600	23.5
DUs on individual plots	59,000	82,400	1,35,600	63,000	3,40,000	31.7
DUs by co-operatives		94,661	72,960	36,000	2,03,621	19.0
Resettlement Schemes	35,000	1,62,700	40,000	18,300	2,56,000	23.9
Slum Rehousing	9,500	6,000	4,500		20,000	1.9
Total	1,09,100	4,05,761	3,82,060	1,74,300	10,71,221	100.0
DUs per year	10,910	40,576	38,206	43,575	31,506	

Source: 'Evaluation of Slum Upgradation Strategies in Delhi', (2001), Pravesh Siroha, Unpublished Thesis, SPA, New Delhi.

70% of the housing to be built was supposed to cater to the EWS and LIG. The distribution pattern given in Table 5 was adopted for housing development. But the performance has been in marked contrast, while even within that there has been a skewed shortage. Thus, of the 70% allotted for the poorer groups, only 58% have actually been achieved. The proportion of middle class groups remains relatively the same. But for the rich, the target has been over-achieved by more than three times. These figures reveal the biases implicit within the decision-makers in the housing development agency itself (DDA) consisting as it does of mainly higher income families. Different surveys have also pointed out that only 40% of the Janata flats were occupied by the poor earning less than Rs 5,000 per month, while 81% of the LIG flats were owned by middle and rich groups, earning more than Rs 5,000 and Rs 10,000 p.m. respectively, [ref – *Rationalisation of Infrastructure Standards, TRIPP, December 2000*] indicating further that it is only the relatively better-off families who can afford DDA-built housing.

This bias continues to operate in DDA's real performance and objectives. For instance, as late as November 2002, DDA had received over 11,000 applications for its recent scheme of sale of 700 flats in Vasant Kunj (essentially for middle class owners), while 23,000 applicants were still waiting to be allotted houses despite registering with DDA since 1979 [see "*DDA to allot 23,000 flats in 3 years*", *Times of India, New Delhi, 23.11.2002*]. Of these 23,000 there were 11,000 Janata flats and 11,000 LIG flats. In spite of this, DDA announced that they would announce

schemes only for HIG flats and no further Janata flats would be constructed [see “DDA will not construct any more Janata flats”, *Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22.11.2002*]. It should be noted that Janata flats are even smaller than LIG flats and have only one room. As per the four models proposed by the Slum Department, the minimum cost of such a flat for resettlement would be Rs 2 lakhs [see “*Slum relocation remains an uphill task*”, *The Hindu, New Delhi, 21.09.2002*]. Two bedroom flats were being priced in the range of between Rs 9 to 16 lakhs. In other words, there is no possibility of poor families being able to afford DDA flats at all.

Table 5: Proposed and Actual Distribution of DUs

Type	Proposed %	Actual %
EWS – Economically Weaker Section	40	30.32
LIG – Lower Income Group	30	27.99
MIG – Middle Income Group	25	22.94
Others (SFS/HIG)	5	18.76

Source: Rationalisation of Infrastructure Standards, TRIPP, December 2000

These figures clearly underline the fact that the working population has not been provided with shelter by the planners and housing agencies and, hence, has had to settle on whatever land is available – much of it already earmarked for residential purposes anyway. The total area on which the JJ Clusters are presently established is a little under 400 hectares (968 acres), as compared to the 20,000 hectares and 11,000 hectares set aside by DDA in the urban area and the urban extension area for residential purposes. DDA itself has further changed the land use category of roughly 5,000 hectares from green areas to mainly residential areas in just 8 years between 1990 to 1998. Of this land, 96.9% was converted from rural, agricultural, and recreational use to 55.6% for residential purposes, only 10.9% for green areas (88% of this was in the new colony of Dwarka), and the remaining 33.5% for offices, industries, and institutions. Since 92.5% of the land was located in the new sub-cities of Dwarka (79.2%), Rohini (14.0%), and Narela (5.6%), clearly the proposed housing was not meant for the poor.

Section IV - Population Growth

Many analysts, planners, and commentators believe that the housing crisis in the city has been made worse by the unanticipated growth of the population, mainly led by migrants who have come from “outside” Delhi and squatted illegally in the centre of the city. The facts, however, present a somewhat different picture. Table 6 gives the population growth in Delhi since the 1951 census.

Table 6: Delhi Population Growth

Year	Population			Percentage Variation Since Previous Census		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
1951	14,37,134	3,06,938	17,44,072	-	-	-
1961	23,59,408	2,99,204	26,58,612	64.2	-2.5	52.4
1971	36,47,023	4,18,675	40,65,698	54.6	39.9	52.9
1981	57,68,200	4,52,206	62,20,406	58.2	8.0	53.0
1991	84,71,625	9,49,019	94,20,644	46.9	109.9	51.5
2001	128,19,761	9,63,215	137,82,976	51.3	1.5	46.3

Source: Delhi Statistical Handbook, 1998

As the above figures show, while the rate of urban growth appears to have slowed down, dropping from 64% in the 50s to 51% in the 90s, there was a quantum increase in rural growth between 1981 and 1991 which has stagnated in the last decade. Thus, the trends indicate that more and more people were settling on the periphery, particularly in the 80s, because land for squatting in the centre is either not available or very strictly policed. As for migration, the data after 1999 (Table 7) indicates that it has roughly averaged 1.3 times the natural growth.

Table 7: Migration trends from 1991-1999

Year	Population as on 1 st July (lakhs)	Increase in population (lakhs)	Total Births	Total Deaths	Natural Increase (C4-C5)	Increase by migration (C3-C6)	Ratio (Natural to Migration)
1991	95.50	3.89	2.72	0.61	2.11	1.78	1:0.84
1992	99.37	3.87	2.74	0.62	2.12	1.75	1:1.02
1993	103.38	4.01	2.70	0.64	2.06	1.95	1:1.18
1994	107.50	4.12	2.62	0.68	1.94	2.18	1:1.42
1995	111.74	4.24	2.75	0.69	2.06	2.18	1:1.38
1996	116.10	4.36	2.83	0.76	2.07	2.29	1:1.50
1997	120.57	4.47	2.89	0.71	2.18	2.29	1:1.55
1998	125.14	4.57	2.84	0.80	2.04	2.52	1:1.79
1999	129.82	4.68	2.88	0.79	2.09	2.59	1:1.24

Source: Socio-Economic Profile of Delhi, 2001-02, Planning Department, GNCTD, New Delhi, page 32

There are possibly very good reasons why people choose to migrate to Delhi. A comparison of the State Government Plan and non-Plan expenditure between Delhi and the neighbouring States (Table 8) show that Delhi invests about 3 times more per capita – and this does not include what the Union Government spends in Delhi

under Central projects. Clearly, therefore, that level of public expenditure is going to provide much greater opportunities for employment than what is available in Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and even Haryana.

Table 8: Per capita Investment in Delhi and neighbouring States

Year 2001-2002	State Government Expenditure (Rs in crores)	Population	Rupees per capita
Central Government	4,10,309	1,027,015,247	3995 (1.35)
Bihar	15,599	82,878,796	1879 (2.88)
Haryana	10,832	21,082,989	5158 (1.05)
Madhya Pradesh	16,794	60,385,118	2799 (1.93)
Rajasthan	19,561	56,443,122	3493 (1.55)
Uttar Pradesh	43,247	166,052,859	2605 (2.08)
Delhi	7,575	13,782,976	5410 (1.00)

Source: Public Finance, Centre for Monitoring, Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. Mumbai, March 2002

Furthermore, as Table 9 indicates, this migrant population is not a parasitic one but is engaged in providing basic services to the city and maintaining the infrastructure. While total workers have remained between 30 to 32% of the total population for the last five decades, employment in the primary sector has dropped significantly while the secondary sector has grown to provide twice the ratio employed, and the tertiary sector remains at about 65%. Thus, the migrant nature of the working population forces it to take up relatively less secure and ill-paid employment and this further strengthens the linkages to living in the slums.

Table 9: No. of Main Workers as per Population Census-Delhi

Sector	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001
Primary	43,130 (7.68)	71,449 (8.36)	60,856 (4.95)	75,731 (3.81)	84,557 (2.85)	NA
Secondary	95,137 (16.94)	2,22,394 (26.03)	3,56,723 (29.04)	6,92,614 (34.87)	9,62,522 (32.43)	NA
Tertiary	4,23,471 (75.38)	5,60,608 (65.61)	8,10,818 (66.01)	12,18,054 (61.32)	19,21,298 (64.72)	NA
Total* Workers	5,61,738 (100.00)	8,54,451 (100.00)	12,28,397 (100.00)	19,86,399 (100.00)	29,68,377 (100.00)	43,03,812 (100.00)
Total Population	17,44,072	26,58,612	40,65,698	62,20,406	94,20,644	137,82,976
% workers to total population	32.21	32.14	30.21	31.93	31.51	31.23

Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of total workers.

* excluding marginal workers

Source: Economic Survey of Delhi 2001-02, page 54

Section V - Slum Locations

What is significant is the distribution of the slums within the city. As may be seen from Table 10, the largest concentrations in 1994 were in the built-up areas of North, South (I), and West (II) Delhi, and in the older city areas of Civil Lines and Karol Bagh. Large squatter populations were also there in North-west (I), West (I), and Trans-Yamuna zones but, given the size of these zones, the concentration was relatively lower. Equally significant is the “protection” offered to the more affluent residential areas of South (II) and West (III) Delhi. There is, obviously, a direct correlation between where the slum population has settled and what kind of services it is offering to the better-off residents or trade and industrial centres of the city.

Table 10: Zonal Distribution of Slum Population in Delhi (1994)

Zones		Total Population	Slum Population	% of Total Population
A	Old City	10.6	1.10	10.4
B	Karol Bagh	4.2	1.40	33.3
C	Civil Lines	7.5	3.00	40.0
D	New Delhi	7.5	1.97	26.3
E	Trans-Yamuna	21.3	3.01	14.1
F	S.Delhi - I	12.7	5.97	47.0
G	W.Delhi - I	14.3	2.96	20.7
H	N.W.Delhi - I	17.7	3.29	18.6
I	S.Delhi - II	2.5	0.10	4.0
J	W.Delhi II	2.5	0.87	34.8
K	W.Delhi - III	5.5	0.50	9.1
L	N.W.Delhi - II	0	0.00	0.0
M	N.W.Delhi - III	3.5	0.66	18.9
N	River Yamuna	0	0.00	0.0
O	N.Delhi	2.5	1.30	52.0
P		3	0.10	3.3
TOTAL		115.25	26.23	

Source: Report on Slums in Delhi, Slum & JJ Dept. MCD, 1994.

The above argument has to be seen within the context of the fact that over 800 JJ Clusters were demolished during the Emergency (1975-76) and resettled in 26 Resettlement Colonies. But, except for a relative dip in the slum population in 1981, the subsequent years saw a significant increase and by 1999 there was a six-fold increase in total families while the number of clusters had returned to the same as before the Emergency. Thus, the huge increase in density in these slums indicated that there was a demand for the services of the working people to build, operate, and maintain the city and its economic structure. This line of reasoning is followed further in the next section.

Section VI - Socio-Economic Profile

Table 11 gives the trend of employment in the city. As can be seen, the major sector in which employment was growing until 1998 was manufacturing and repair services. Community, Social, and Personal Services and Retail Trade were the other sectors in which jobs were still available, while Wholesale Trade displayed a significant decline. Thus, it is clear that the working population – which is roughly 31% of the total population – forms the backbone of the city's economy.

Table 11: Classification of workers by major activity group

S.N.	Major Activity Group	Workers ('000)		
		1980	1990	1998
1.	Agricultural activities (Other than crop production and plantation)	17 (1.15)	21 (1.01)	22 (0.64)
2.	Mining and Quarrying	12 (0.82)	9 (0.43)	0 (0.00)
3.	Manufacturing & repair services	463 (31.45)	636 (30.52)	1440 (41.13)
4.	Electricity, Gas & Water Supply	20 (1.36)	21 (1.01)	115 (3.29)
5.	Construction	8 (0.54)	11 (0.53)	22 (0.63)
6.	Wholesale Trade	256 (17.39)	105 (5.04)	158 (4.52)
7.	Retail Trade	--	340 (16.31)	535 (15.30)
8.	Hotels & Restaurants	59 (4.01)	80 (3.84)	115 (3.30)
9.	Transport	49 (3.33)	62 (2.97)	136 (3.90)
10.	Storage & Warehousing	20 (1.36)	33 (1.58)	27 (0.77)
11.	Communications	21 (1.43)	51 (2.45)	97 (2.79)
12.	Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services	112 (7.61)	194 (9.31)	207 (5.43)
13.	Community, Social & Personal Services	435 (29.55)	521 (25.00)	622 (17.78)
	Total	1472 (100)	2084 (100)	3500 (100)

Note: Figure in the brackets denotes the percentage to the total.

Source: Socio-Economic Profile of Delhi – 2001-02, Planning Department, GNCTD, New Delhi, page 13.

Very little data seems to exist, or has been made public, about the socio-economic profile of the city's slum population. This data is necessary for proposing any housing policy for the urban poor. Some sectional studies of jhuggi jhopri clusters and resettlement colonies, however, paint a grim picture of the conditions and livelihood of this population.

A socio-economic survey was conducted by several groups affiliated to the Sajha Manch, working in jhuggi jhopris, resettlement colonies, and unauthorised colonies in 1999-2000. Data from 1600 households in 13 such colonies yielded a revealing picture of the socio-economic profile of the population living in these settlements (see Table 12). The vast majority (over two-thirds) had small families, were young and educated, lived in sub-standard housing (87% of the jhuggis occupied less than 10 sq.m. space), depended on handpumps and public latrines, and had to go to private doctors for treatment.

While over one-third of the households reported more than one working member, the majority of workers were in service jobs and daily wagers, earned less than Rs 2,000 per month, and travelled by foot or cycle. About 84 per cent of the workers in the JJ Clusters were in 'temporary' jobs and about 72 per cent were 'unskilled'. Less than one-fifth had electricity connections or gas cylinders for cooking. Out of the total work trips 39 per cent were made by cycles and 22 per cent were walk trips. Only 3 per cent of the population living in these sub-standard settlements had access to sewerage.

Table 12: Profile of JJs and Resettlement Colonies

[figures in percentages]	Resettlement Colonies	Jhuggi-Jhopri Cluster
Nature of work		
Office/Service	34.8	41.7
Big Factory	3.5	0.66
Small Factory	19.2	2.53
Shop	11.6	10.12
House	2.5	8.15
Thela/Cart	2.0	1.78
Daily Wages	26.3	35.05
Unskilled	20.16	72.25
Semiskilled	19.38	4.62
Skilled	60.46	23.12
Permanent	67.44	16.2
Temporary	32.56	83.79
Housing space		
0-10 sq.m.	11.59	87.36
11-25 sq.m.	78.98	9.9
26-50 sq.m.	8.69	2.16
51-100 sq.m.	0.72	0.57
101sq.m. & above	0	0

Source: Sajha Manch, 2000

Another sample study with 247 households in four slums in 2000 revealed an astonishing range of occupations. While there were 20 respondents who did not reply, only 3 said they were unemployed. The rest were doing productive work in

constructing, repairing, and maintaining both commercial as well residential activities (Table 13).

Table 13: Occupational background of slum dwellers

Occupation	Number	Occupation	Number
Service	63	Cobbler	2
Labour	35	Nothing	1
Government employee	12	Water vending	1
Shopkeeper	11	Scooter repair	1
Creche Organiser	1	Finer work	1
Maid servant	13	Watchman	1
Tailor	8	Grains on rickshaw	1
Driver	7	Hawker	1
Mason	7	Sell food	1
Rickshaw puller	6	Trade union	1
In house	6	Junk Dealer	1
Hawker on wheels	6	White washer	1
Private job	5	Painter	1
Business/Self employed	4	Ration supply	1
Social worker	3	Gardner	1
Auto rickshaw	3	Servant	1
Motor mechanic	3	Ice cream vendor	1
Security guard	2	Clothes on rickshaw	1
Unemployed	2	Maternity work	1
Electrician	2	Fridge repair work	1
Carpenter	2	Press	1
Sell vegetable	2	Teacher	1
Contractor	2	No response	20

Source: Sajha Manch, 2000

Section VII - Slum Clearance Act

To some extent there has been a failure on the part of the planners to anticipate the growth of the city and its hinterland. For instance, the MPD-62 projected a population for 1981 as 50 lakhs, whereas the actual population by 1981 Census was 62.2 lakhs. But this growth was a consequence of the (non-Plan) Asiad Games in 1980, which called for the influx of a huge construction and maintenance work force. If one were to deduct the 10 lakh labourers (and their families) who were reportedly brought into the city during that period [*ref – Peoples Union for Democratic Rights, The Other Face of Asiad 82, Delhi, October 1982*], then the total population would have been somewhat nearer to the projected one. Learning from the experience of the first Master Plan period, the initial projection for the second Plan period was 144 lakhs, but DDA arbitrarily pegged it at 128 lakhs, the NCRPB (National Capital Region Planning Board) stipulated an even lower figure of 112 lakhs, while the actual population in 2001 is roughly 138 lakhs [*ref – MPD 2001, DDA, August 1990, page 2*].

What is interesting is that the actual population of the Delhi Metropolitan Area (DMA), Delhi State, and National Capital Region (NCR) in 1981 was about 19 %, 25 %, and 52 % higher, respectively, than projected in 1962 [*ref – Can the Clock be Turned Back, WWF Report, August 1995, page 32*]. In other words, it was not just the central city that was growing, the hinterland was growing even faster. Hence, the argument that Delhi's growth can be controlled by moving the population to the peripheral towns does not have much merit. Those towns are expanding faster than Delhi and conditions there are much worse than in the capital.

But the non-recognition of the above processes by planners has resulted in the growth of slums and, therefore, of "slum clearance" programmes. The Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act was enacted as early as 1956 by Parliament, which provided for slum areas to be 'declared'. Thus, the 'competent authority' under the Act may notify an area to be a slum area where the buildings (a) are in any respect unfit for human habitation, or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangements and design of such buildings, narrowness of faulty arrangements of streets, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors are detrimental to safety, health, or morals. Such a definition provides an extremely wide discretion to the 'competent authority' [*ref – Section 3 of "Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956*].

But it is not only slum areas as so defined which are treated by policy makers as slums. For instance, the National Sample Survey Organisation defines all *kachha* structures with inadequate latrine and water facilities as ‘undeclared’ slums. Consequently, for all practical purposes, the slums in Delhi can be broadly categorised as (1) Notified slums (2) Unauthorised Slums (3) Resettlement Colony and (4) JJ Clusters. The areas that have been notified under Slum Act, on the one hand enable the dweller to execute improvement works on his own. At the same time, the Act empowers the competent authority to serve a notice upon the owner of the building or upon the owner of the land requiring him to execute the works of improvement within a specified time which should be not less than 30 days [ref – see Section 4 of the Act].

While the Act specifies measures for both clearance and improvement, government policy appears to favour improvement – although the real performance, as we shall see, may be quite different. The lofty intent of such a policy is best brought out in following words of one of the senior officials of the DDA:

“That keeping in view the policies of planned growth of urbanisation, income support and poverty, alleviation, and together with steps to arrest the growth of slums in urban areas, the Central and the state governments would have to take steps to avoid forcible relocation or dis-housing of slum dwellers and encourage in-situ upgradation, slum renovation, and progressive housing development with conferment of occupancy rights wherever feasible, and to undertake selective relocation with community involvement only for clearance for priority sites in public interest..” [ref – Counter affidavit of DDA in National Alliance of Peoples Delhi Chapter V. Govt. of NCT, Delhi and Ors.; Civil W.P. No 4229/96 dated February 1997].

Section VIII - Municipal Policies

In an affidavit filed on its behalf in the Supreme Court, the Slum and JJ Department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) has affirmed that, since 1990, the Department has adopted a three pronged strategy to tackle the problems of JJ clusters [*ref – ALMITRA H. PATEL & OTHERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS, page-5*]

Environmental Improvement in Urban Slums : Basic amenities such as water, toilets, bathrooms, drainage, pavements, dhalaos, Basti Vikas Kendras, Shishu Vatikas, and community spaces are extended to the JJ clusters within a norm of Rs 800 per capita (or about Rs 4,000 per jhuggi). The Delhi Government provides necessary funds to the tune of Rs 20 crores for this purpose (adequate, incidentally, for only 50,000 jhuggies at the given norm). What is not provided is equally important: primary schools, dispensaries, and crucial infrastructural services like workplaces, roads, transport, parks, and hospitals.

In-Situ Upgradation : Re-alignment of plots and widening of pavements etc. is followed in those cases where the JJ clusters are likely to continue for the next 10 to 15 years, and where the land owning agency gives a 'No Objection Certificate' saying that the land is not required by it for that period. However, "due to reluctance on the part of the land owning agencies to issue such No Objection Certificate (NOC), this scheme is not progressing". Only in the first phase was in-situ upgradation work initiated for 4,800 squatter families at Shahbad Daulatpur, but the second phase for 4,500 squatter families could not proceed because DDA refused to give the NOC. The cost for such upgradation works out to roughly Rs 20,000 per jhuggi

Relocation of J.J.Clusters is resorted to where the land owning agencies want the land for project implementation "of public importance" and agree to contribute Rs 29,000 per jhuggi towards cost of relocation, with Rs 10,000 from Delhi Government, and Rs 7,000 'contribution' from the jhuggi dweller (making a total of Rs 46,000 per jhuggi). Jhuggi families who have a Ration Card dated before 31.1.90 are provided with 18sq.m. of land with 7sq.m. open space in the courtyard at group level. Families settled after Jan. 1990 are given only 12.5 sq.m. plots with a common group courtyard, and the land owning agency has to pay only Rs 20,000 for their relocation, the other amounts remaining the same. In 10 years from 1990 to 2000, the Department claims to have relocated 22,215 jhuggis from all over the city to distant sites outside the urban area.

It would be useful to examine how this three-pronged strategy has worked in actual practice.

Section IX - Performance of Strategy

Table 14 gives the outlay for 2001-2002 of the Urban Development Department of the GNCTD. It shows that there is a total outlay on services of almost Rs 85 crores. However, of this, as much as Rs 64 crores comes from special schemes for sanitation, water supply, and child development with multi-lateral or bi-lateral funding. Curiously enough, the environmental argument for providing sanitation in JJ Clusters is also being used to evict them on the ground that they are polluting the river Yamuna [see *Yamuna Plan suffers a setback*”, *The Hindu, New Delhi, 28.10.2002*]. Hence, the three prongs of the strategy are closely intertwined and priorities can be shifted at executive, judicial, or political whim.

Table 14: Housing and Civic Outlays for 2001-02

S.No.	Name of the Sector/Scheme	Rs (in lakhs)
<i>I.</i>	<i>Urban Development</i>	
1.	Construction of Basti Vikas Kendras	100.00
2.	In-Situ Upgradation of JJ Clusters	150.00
3.	Environmental Improvement in JJ Clusters	200.00
4.	Construction of Pay Use Jansuvidha Complex	100.00
5.	Shishu Vatika/Common Space in JJ Clusters	50.00
6.	National Slum Development Programme	1900.00
7.	Sanitation in JJ Clusters	2500.00
8.	Urban Basic Services	150.00
9.	Swaran Jayanti Shahri Rojgar Yojana	125.00
<i>II.</i>	<i>Water Supply & Sanitation</i>	
1.	Water Supply in JJ Clusters	1000.00
<i>III.</i>	<i>Energy</i>	
1.	Electricity Connection in JJ Household	500.00
<i>IV.</i>	<i>Health & Family Welfare</i>	
1.	Mobile Van Dispensaries for JJ Clusters	300.00
2.	Health Centres in JJ Clusters	400.00
<i>V</i>	<i>Social Welfare Department</i>	
1.	Integrated Child Development Scheme	995.00
	Total	8470.00

Source: Socio-Economic Profile of Delhi, 2000-01, Planning Department, GNCTD, New Delhi

Environmental Improvement

As may be seen from Table 14, the Environmental Improvement strategy has been allotted only 23% of the outlay, if one ignores the National Slum Development Programme and the scheme for Sanitation in JJ Clusters, both of which are specially funded programmes (and only 4% if one does not). This gives an idea of the priority given to this strategy by the government. Under this strategy, basic amenities such as water, toilets, bathrooms, drainage, pavements, dhalaos, Basti Vikas Kendras,

community spaces, etc. are extended to the JJ clusters within a norm of Rs 800 per capita. Delhi Government provides necessary funds to the tune of Rs 20 crores for this purpose. The facilities provided since 1990 and up to March 2000 are as follows:

- 19,049 toilets at 657 locations.
- 18,00,340 sq.m. of pavements and 8,49,000 m. of drains in most locations.
- 2692 water hydrants, 892 deep handpumps, 4 tubewells up to 1991-92. DJB has been providing water supply after that.
- 192 Basti Vikas Kendras.
- 284 Shishu Vatikas

The above figures reveal that perhaps less than half the JJC clusters have been provided with even the basic urban amenities of water and sanitation. What is not provided is equally important: Primary schools; Dispensaries; Street lights; Peripheral infrastructural services like roads, transport, parks, workplaces, and hospitals.

In-Situ Upgradation

Table 14 also makes clear that the budget for the In-Situ Upgradation strategy is as much as 75% that for Environmental Improvement, but given the fact that Upgradation costs 5 times as much as Improvement, such a provision will be able to “upgrade” only 15% as many jhuggies as are “improved”. This is borne out by the fact that, if both phases of the Upgradation Strategy as given above are assumed to be successful, they will tackle at best 10,000 jhuggis (which is 1.7% of total estimated jhuggis). In-Situ Upgradation was, in fact, announced as the preferred strategy by the Minister of Urban Development in 2001 with a halt to relocations (essentially because it was becoming more difficult to find land for resettlement sites) [see “*On site rehab of slums mooted*”, *Sunday Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 10.11.2002*]. But in the 1½ years since then over 20,000 jhuggis have been demolished, while there has not been a single case of Upgradation. Even in the earlier phase, In-Situ Upgradation - through re-alignment of plots, widening of pavements etc. - was to be followed in those cases where the JJ clusters were likely to continue for the next 10 to 15 years, and where the land owning agency was to give a ‘No Objection Certificate’ saying that the land was not required by it for that period. However, “due to reluctance on the part of the land owning agencies to issue such No Objection Certificate, this scheme is not progressing”. Only in the first phase was in-situ upgradation work initiated for 4800 squatter families at Shahbad

Daulatpur, but the second phase for 4500 squatter families could not proceed because DDA did not give the NOC.

Multi-Storey Settlement

A special case of in-situ upgradation is supposed to be in the form of multi-storeyed housing with the bottom floor being earmarked for commercial development in order to subsidise upper floors allocated to the slum dwellers for housing [see *“Pucca future for slums”*, *Sunday Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 10.11.2002*]. This is not the first time, though, that multi-storeyed housing is being proposed in Delhi. The slum dwellers of Motia Khan Basti were evicted 20 km away to Rohini Sector-IV, in February 2002. The resettlement provision at Rohini consists of 2000 flats in 5-floor (G+4) structures without any lift. The ground floor is reserved for commercial purpose while the rest has been given over for residential purposes. Those who are allotted commercial space are not given any residential flats. The size of every shop is different, varying from 12 sq. m to 18 sq. m. The criteria for allotting the shops is not clear and there is only one toilet against 8 shops.

Initially the evictees had to pay Rs 25,000 for registration and getting possession of the one-room flat (costing about Rs 1 lakh each). 20-25 families are still residing on street because they could not pay this initial amount. Although it has not been finalised yet, the flat-holders may have to pay Rs 1800 to 2100 every month for the next 15 years to the government (totalling over Rs 3 lakhs). This amount, it needs to be remembered, is being levied from families who have lost regular sources of livelihood because of displacement. Each room is so small, that there is no space left after laying 2 small beds. Contractors are well aware of the fact that they are making flats for poor people, which reflects in the quality of the construction materials. The bathroom/toilet space, sewerage system is a nightmare, as almost all sewer lines are clogged and out of order. Many residents are compelled to go into the open for defecation. The ground water is saline so Government is supplying inadequate drinking water through tankers once a day for the entire population. Families residing on the 5th floor have to fetch water through the narrow staircase every day. Initially, there was a system of garbage collection, which is not in place any more.

Resettlement

The third scheme of the Government relates to relocation of JJ clusters. As per government policy the relocation is necessitated on the basis of certain priorities as follows:

1. where the land is required for specific projects;
2. because the existing JJ clusters are a cause of social tension in the area;
3. from areas where they are continuously exposed to the vagaries of nature such as 'Yamuna Bandh';
4. from along the railway tracks for both environmental and human safety.

Such a policy of eviction and relocation has a long history. Before 1975, 18 Resettlement Colonies were constructed for 53,317 households, who were provided with 2-room built tenements (3,560 nos.), 80 sq. yd. plots (3,667 nos.), and 25 sq.yd. camping sites (46,090 nos.). During the Emergency (1975-76) 1,52,310 squatter families were forcibly moved into another 26 Resettlement Colonies on the city periphery with plots of only 21 sq.m., covering a total area of 1,570 ha. [ref – *Economic Survey 2001-2002, Chapter 14, Page 7*]. Subsequent resettlement during the 90s further reduced the plot size to 18 sq.m. while charging a license fee of Rs 7,000 and presently a family is entitled to a plot of 12.5 sq.m. only [ref – *Restructuring New Delhi's Urban Habitat: Building an Apartheid City? Habitat International Coalition*]. Thus, the land available for a family has been steadily reducing over the last 30 years. Additionally, much of the Rs 1900 lakhs allocated for the National Slum Development Programme (Table 14) has been targeted towards resettlement schemes.

It is important to note that the relocation scheme of the government is based on two assumptions: (1) all the squatters occupying public land would be given alternative sites (on the basis of cut-off dates, beyond which jhuggies would not be eligible for relocation); and (2) no new jhuggies would be allowed to come up on public land in Delhi after the cut-off date. The National Alliance of People's Movements has pointed out before the High Court that the government has failed on both these grounds. In these circumstances the rationale of the cut-off dates is open to question, is unreasonable, and seems to be arbitrary and hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

In 2001, a team from Habitat International Coalition carried out public hearings in 12 such Resettlement Sites dating from 1975 to 2001. They found a uniform degree of

violation of not only national laws at these sites, but also contravention of international treaties and conventions to which the Indian government has been a signatory. The team made the following observations:

1. Conflicts of policy between the MCD, DDA, Ministry of Urban Development, the railways, and the Government of India lead to inconsistencies in practice and implementation of decisions;
2. There is corruption, coercion and arbitrary practices in the identification and implementation of eviction of the JJs and in the allocation of resettlement sites;
3. Courts at all levels in the country are issuing judgements that lead to forced evictions;
4. The evictions, relocation, resettlement-site conditions and services are in violation of current Delhi Master Plan provisions;
5. Resettlement policy and practice are inconsistent with domestic law and breaches India's international obligations under international human rights instruments;
6. Evictions are falsely touted as solutions to slum problems. In fact, they have not worked historically, due to the absence of secure tenure, the lack of economic opportunity, effectively void of even the most basic civic amenities (water, access to health services, education, sanitation) and lacking consultation with, and consent of those affected;
7. The current resettlement policy is an affront to the cultural values and lifestyle of most Indians, and it portends future urban inner city conflict and problems reminiscent of many other cities in crisis around the world;
8. Sound policies, humane governance and respect for human rights, including housing and land rights of Delhi's residents can obviate the additional losses to victims and the public cost burdens that result from forced evictions.

Source: Restructuring New Delhi's Urban Habitat: Building an Apartheid City? Habitat International Coalition Fact Finding Mission on the Resettlement Process of Delhi.

Section X - Land Availability

The rejection of the In-Situ strategy in practice has been legitimised by the argument that the land has been illegally occupied, it is required for specific projects by the land owning agency, and that no further land is available nearby. The paradox now is that even land on the periphery of the city is reportedly becoming more difficult to acquire and the costs of relocation of jhuggies to these far-off places is steeply rising [see *“Slum relocation remains an uphill task”, The Hindu, New Delhi, 21.09.2002*]. Provision of services is also becoming more difficult and urban trunk lines have not yet been developed in such areas. Hence, the question of land availability begins to acquire much importance and requires a closer look.

The total area of the Union Territory of Delhi is 148,639 hectares (ha). Out of this territory, MPD-1962 envisaged an increase in the urbanisable area from 17,278 ha to 44,736 ha. An examination of the land use plan given in MPD-2001 indicates that an area of approximately 48,777 ha has been indicated as urban and the balance of the area outside it as rural. MPD-2001 also proposed an Urban Extension Area (UEA) of 18,000-24,000 ha to accommodate around 3-4 million populations [Delhi 1999 A Fact Sheet, NCRPB]. The land in the UEA was to be distributed in different land uses in the manner given in Table 15. It is not clear how much of this UEA land has been actually developed, but some scattered figures available from DDA publications suggest that as much as 18,851 ha may have been earmarked in Dwarka, Narela, Dheerpur, Rohin, Vasant Kunj, and Jasola, of which 9,099 ha have been actually acquired [ref – *Delhi, The Millenopolis, DDA*].

Table 15: Proposed Land Use for Urban Extension Area

Land Use	% of Land
Residential	45-55
Commercial	3-4
Industrial	6-7
Recreational	15-20
Public & semi-public facilities	8-10
Circulation	10-12

Source: MPD-2001, DDA, Page 4

If one takes the 19,190 ha assigned for residential use in 1962, and adds to that the 45-55% earmarked for residential purposes in the UEA (18,000-24,000 ha), then there should be at least 27,000 ha (or at most, 32,000 ha) of residential land with DDA in the city. The number of JJs settled on land of different agencies is given in Table 16. JJs, which are supposed to be in violation of the Master Plan and its Land Use provisions, have reportedly encroached only 460 ha of land (968 acres) of which DDA owns only 184 ha. These figures, at the maximum, indicate that far less

than 2% of the residential land has been “encroached” to provide for the housing needs of 24% of the urban population. Hence, the sweeping statement of an ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court [ref – *ALMITRA H. PATEL & OTHERS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS*, page 578] that, “ Establishing or creating of slums, it seems, appears to be good business and is well organised . . . Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for private use free of cost . . .” is not only misplaced but goes against the data supplied by official “land owning” agencies themselves.

Table 16: JJ Clusters on Lands of Various Agencies - 1994

Land Owning Agency	No. of JJs
D.D.A.	700
L&DO	76
Railways	65
Slum Department	30
M.C.D.	23
Gram Sabha	16
Cantonment	11
N.D.M.C.	6
Others	153
TOTAL	1080

Source: Report on Slums in Delhi, Slum & JJ Department, MCD, 1994

According to DDA, it has so far totally acquired 23,817 ha of land out of which 23,728 ha have already been developed and disposed of for various purposes (see Table 17). Of this, 10,599 ha have been given over for residential purposes. The curious question that then emerges is what has happened to the balance 8,591 ha of residential land (from MPD-62 provisions) or 16,400 ha (by minimum provisions of MPD-2001) or 21,600 ha (maximum provisions under MPD-2001)? Even if one were to deduct the land utilised for Resettlement (2,397 ha) and for Co-operative Societies (2,322 ha) – assuming that their allocation does not fall within ‘residential’ areas – then there should still be sufficient land available (ranging from a minimum of 3,900 ha to a maximum of 19,900 ha) for housing those JJs encroaching on a mere 460 ha of land (960 acres). In fact, if the minimum missing land (3,900 ha) were divided into plots for allotment to the estimated 6 lakh shelterless and slum families, within present planning norms each family would get a plot of 30 sq.m. size.

Table 17: Land utilisation by DDA

Schemes	Land Development (in ha)
Residential Schemes	10,599
Industrial Schemes	1,116
Horticulture Development	3,274
Slum & JJ Resettlement Scheme	2,397
Commercial, Institutional, Govt. Semi-govt. Private agencies	4,020
Co-operative societies (GHBS)	2,322

Note: All figures have been converted from acres in the original

Source: Delhi-City Scapes by DDA, Public Relations Deptt. DDA

Another curious question that comes to mind is that a total of 2,397 ha has been allocated for Resettlement purposes. As we have seen before, 53,317 households were resettled before 1975 and provided with 2-room built tenements (3,560 nos.), 80 sq. yd. plots (3,667 nos.), and 25 sq.yd. camping sites (46,090 nos.). During the Emergency (1975-76) another 1,52,310 squatter families were resettled on an area of 1,570 ha. Thus, this total area itself would work out to be a little over 2,000 ha. Does this mean that less than 400 ha were made available for all the resettlement in the 20 years between 1977 and 1996? It is estimated that roughly 40,000 jhuggi families were evicted during this period.

In an effort to check the validity of the above arguments, Hazards Centre acquired the lists of JJC and plotted them on the digital map of Delhi (Map 1). This overlay clearly indicated that 98% of the JJC were clearly within the Urban Area of 1962 and, of these, roughly 42% were on land earmarked for residential purposes while 47% were located on institutional and industrial land. None of the latter had associated housing colonies for the work force. Hence, the idea of “encroachment” on “public” land is largely a myth. Unfortunately, since DDA has never operated in a transparent manner, these questions have never been answered. Nevertheless, the land should be available somewhere – because it is there on paper. Let us now see whether the land actually exists on the ground. Since an alliance of grass-roots organisations cannot possibly conduct a survey all over the city, we confine ourselves to three of the cases that have been studied in some detail by member organisations of the Sajha Manch.

Section XI - Case Studies

Punjab Garden

The Honourable Supreme Court has directed that major polluting industries should be relocated out of the NCT. However, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) has appealed against this directive on the grounds that it would cause severe financial hardship to the small industrial units. Hence, the GNCTD, through the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (DSIDC), is constructing a number of Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) for treating industrial effluents although, at present, there is no facility for treating or disposing of the sludge that would be produced.

One such CETP is proposed to be set up near Punjab Garden on the *North* bank of the Najafgarh Nala, immediately to the west of the place where the Nala is crossed by the New Rohtak Road [*ref – Phase II report, Volume II, Combined CETP for Najafgarh Road Industrial Area Moti Nagar Industrial Estate, NEERI, June 1996*] (see Map 2). The entire industrial area is drained by two main sewers and for the effluents present in these sewers to reach the proposed CETP, which is on the other side of the Najafgarh nala, they would have to be pumped across the nala and a separate line (3 km long) would have to be constructed on the other side to access the CETP. Furthermore, the CETP is to be constructed in an area designated as 'residential' by DDA's Land Use Map (1996) and is, therefore, in violation of the Master Plan. Logically, the CETP should be located within the industrial area itself or in an adjacent area earmarked for utilities. At the moment there are extensive vacant areas lying in the Najafgarh Industrial Area where industrial closures have taken place.

According to the Detailed Project Report for the CETP [*ref – Phase II Report, Design of Common Effluent Treatment Plants for Industrial Estates in NCT of Delhi, Vol.II, NEERI, June 1996*], the land requirement is only 2,958 sq.m. There are several plots within the industrial area that are lying vacant and are large enough for this purpose. Even on the other side of the nala, the land available is in excess of 10,000 sq.m. (see Map 3). On this land there were 27 families residing for the last 14 to 25 years, whose occupational background is given in Table 18. As may be seen from the data, they were all providing services to the neighbouring colonies and the average distance to work ranged between ½ to 1 km. Thus, it made eminent economic and social sense for them to be allowed to settle where they were through the In Situ Upgradation strategy.

Table 18: Occupational break up of Punjab Garden slum residents

Type	Nos.
Mason	9
Domestic help	6
Daily wagers	5
Riskhaw puller	4
Priest	1
Dairy worker	1
Chowkidar	1

Source: Sajha Manch

For space considerations, if we allow that each family requires 50 sq.m. of land to live a reasonably decent life, then the total land requirement would be about 2,700 sq.m. Given that there was an excess of 7,000 sq.m. land available – even after allotting to the CETP – the feasibility of fashioning an in-situ upgradation scheme at this location was very favourable. The land owning agency – the Flood and Irrigation Department – was even amenable to the idea. But a combination of bureaucratic resistance from the MCD and political opposition from the residents of the nearby “planned” colonies forced the eviction of the slum dwellers to far-off Bakarwala.

Jaunapur

The Gram Sabha land of Jaunapur lies in the extreme south of National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCTD) in Mehrauli Block. It is located on the slopes of an outcrop adjacent to the Chattarpur basin and the drainage from this basin flows west and southwards through the Gram Sabha land. It has been proposed as the location for resettlement of 2,000 families with total population of about 10,000 who are being evicted from the nearby Asola Wildlife Sanctuary in the Southern Ridge. An area of 24 hectares has been earmarked for the purposes of resettlement in this rocky and undulating area (see Map 4). The resettlement has been opposed by the residents of the nearby farmhouses [ref – *The Unacknowledged Legacy of Bhatti Mines, Anita Soni, 1999-2002*] and, hence, an alternative site has been suggested at Holambi Khurd in the far north, which is about 50 km away from Bhatti Mines – closed by Supreme Court orders since 1990 as it lies within the Asola Wildlife Sanctuary.

This is critical because 75% of the evictees belong to the two communities of Oads and Kumhars. The Oads have been a nomadic tribe of hereditary diggers specialising in earthen masonry. The Kumhars are an artisan caste of clay moulders. The expertise of both communities in the logistics of extracting and transporting loads of earth on the backs of their ponies was crucial in quarrying at Bhatti Mines, where they came as specially requisitioned work force at the behest of the local panchayat about 25 years ago. After the closure of Bhatti, 60% of the Oads and 23%

continued with mining-related occupations near the quarries of Haryana. But, increasingly, there has been a shift towards unskilled daily labour. [*Source of socio-economic data: Everybody Loves Bhatti Mines, Dr Anita Soni, CSDS, 2002*].

Hence, it is important that the community remain near areas where work suitable to their skills is available. However, the farmhouse owners' opposition has taken advantage of the fact that Mehrauli Block as a whole has been identified as an area where there is a severe groundwater crisis. They have argued that the resettlement colony would consume additional quantities of ground water, which the area can ill afford. The fact is that the population of (officially) 20,000 would require the proposed amount of water no matter where it is located. The comparison with the water quality in the Alipur block (where most of the new relocation sites are coming up) indicates that Mehrauli block is superior in every respect [*ref – i) Ground water Situation in Delhi: Red Alert; P.S. Dutta, Nuclear Research Laboratory, Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi, January 1999; ii) An Environmental Examination of the Jaunapur Relocation Site, Hazards Centre, August 2002*]. It may be noted in this context that the three clusters being evicted from Asola each have a 140 m deep tube well that is presently supplying adequate water.

The depletion of ground water in Mehrauli can only be explained by the huge extraction by the farms to the north of Jaunapur. There are over 160 farmhouses in the region bounded by the Mehrauli-Gurgaon Road, Chattarpur, Maidangarhi and Ayanagar (Map 5). The total number in this area of the Southern Ridge may be as high as 300. These "farms" are not used for agriculture but are actually the farmhouses of the rich and wealthy. If each one of them has at least one tube well which is delivering 75 m³ of water per day, as reported by the CGWB, then the total annual extraction of groundwater by these farmhouses alone (south of Chattarpur) would be of the order of 8.21 MCM, which is almost 44% of the replenishable resource. If one were to include all the other farmhouses in the Chattarpur basin, then the extraction may be almost three times higher.

In conclusion, three points have to be considered before any relocation plans are made:

- No matter where the displaced population is relocated, it will still require a certain quantity and quality of water and Mehrauli Block is better than any other site in GNCTD, particularly given the past abysmal record of resettlement.

- Water is only one of the parameters that determine the location of a settlement. Others such as employment, land, shelter, transport, and civic facilities are equally important and these should be governed by city-wide minimum norms.
- As long as excessive extraction of groundwater takes place by the farms in Mehrauli Block, which are not really engaged in agriculture, the drinking water needs of any other population can never be met.

Sanjay Camp

Sanjay Camp is situated in the very heart of the posh areas of South Delhi. At a larger level, it is surrounded by up-marker plotted development and the flatted development designed by DDA. Its immediate environs, however, consist of resettlement colonies like Dakshinpuri and Madangir, and it is located next to the cremation grounds (Map 6). The area has approximately 1,100 jhuggis with a population of over 6,000. The work-force consists of predominantly daily-wage labourers (44%) as painters, mechanics, sweepers, construction workers etc, while the other occupations are handcart vending, driving private cars, servicing the private sector, tailors, and domestic maids. 80% of the residents earn less than Rs 3,000 per month. 36% walk to work, 20% cycle, while 40% use public transport and 80% find work within a 10 km radius.

Focus group discussions amongst the residents suggest that:

- If they are relocated they would not get any compensation for the investment they have made in making the land habitable and constructing their houses (about Rs 40,000) and would have to start completely from scratch at the new location.
- They are willing to invest in upgradation provided they get security of tenure.
- They currently have well-established linkages in the job market that ensures that they find continuous employment all the year round.
- The area around Sanjay Camp is unhygienic and unsafe by design and could be better utilised to provide housing space to the residents.

Source of socio-economic data: A multi-level approach for designing effective and low-cost solutions for upgradation of quality of life of the urban poor in India, Anvita Anand, TRIPP, 2002

Partly based on the above considerations, the MCD has made available a triangular plot of land near Vayusenabad admeasuring 5800 sq.m. and suggested it as a site for in-situ upgradation. According to plans made by the Laurie Baker Building Centre, the site can be used to construct 352 DUs of size 24 sq.m. each, as part of four-storeyed structures (Map 7). However, this will barely accommodate one-fourth of the total population and is not in line with the requirements expressed by the residents of Sanjay Camp. Hence, an architect commissioned by Action India [ref – *Construction of Flat for Slum Settlement, Sanjay Camp, Dakshinpuri, New Delhi, Action India*], a social action group working in the area, has designed an alternative layout with three-storeyed structures containing 195 DUs of the same size (Map 8). This still leaves the question of where would the remaining 900 families go. In addition, while the Laurie Baker DUs would cost Rs 1,20,314 (including the cost of land), the Action India DUs would be priced at Rs 1,09,140 – and both are outside the reach of the community at present.

Consequently, Action India workers assisted by Hazards Centre professionals launched a search for available locations for housing purposes in the area. They found at least three vacant plots totalling over 45,000 sq.m. (Map 9). If this land were made available for housing purposes, each family would get at least 30 sq.m. of land to build a single-storied house on according to current building norms. However, the survey team also found significant violations of norms by the administration itself. Thus, the land use specifications of the Master Plan have been repeatedly violated not only by the Zonal Plan but also by actual developments on the ground (Map 10).

Furthermore, the population density norms have not been observed at all. While the Master Plan specifies an average density of 600 persons per hectare – or roughly 120 DUs per hectare (assuming an average family size of 5), the actual measured density in the resettlement colony of Dakshinpuri (officially built during the Emergency) is 720 DUs per hectare. This “violation” may be ascribed to the requirements of the resettled community but, not surprisingly, the density in the DDA built Janata flats is currently even higher at 1,220 DUs per hectare. If these densities are officially acceptable, then the land available in Ambedkar Nagar would be more than adequate to house all the slums in the area. However, this may not be acceptable to the residents of the nearby “planned” colonies.

Section XII - Investment Survey

Thus, what we see in all the three cases studied above is that land is available for housing in different parts of Delhi, most of it in areas officially marked for residential land use. We also see that there is objection by other 'authorised' residents to using this land for resettlement of those sections who provide necessary services and labour to fulfil the needs of the 'authorised'. We further see that a significant part of the 'authorised' have become so by virtue of having officially violated the Master Plan itself. The last element we, therefore, need to examine before proposing an alternative policy on shelter, is the capacity of the people who will build and maintain these shelters.

A survey by Sajha Manch in three slums of a sample of 163 households suggests that as many as 90% build their own huts and, hence, do not either pay rent or purchase the hut from someone else (Table 19). The cost of construction itself varies between Rs 10,000 to Rs 40,000 but averages Rs 20,000. This figure matches with that offered by the residents of Sanjay camp given above. Hence, this may be taken to the amount of capital that slum dwellers can gather (either through savings or loans) to invest in a house. If there is security of tenure they may even be able to raise more, although this appears to be somewhat doubtful given the fact that it has been reported that many evictees in the recent round of relocations have been hard put to find the Rs 7,000 required to pay the license fee for the privilege of getting a plot in a Resettlement Colony for a period of 10 years. The point to be made is that if a slum dweller can muster up only so much resource, it is pointless offering him/her a flat for even Rs 1 lakh, leave alone the Rs 3 lakhs that a Janata flat currently costs.

Table 19: Investment by slum dwellers

Parameters	Cost of purchase		Cost of construction		Monthly rent	
	No	%	No	%	No	%
0-1000	9	5.5	3	1.8	4	2.4
1000-2000	6	3.7	11	6.8	3	1.8
2000-5000	7	4.3	19	11.7	7	4.3
5001-10000	8	4.9	18	11.0	1	0.6
10001-15000	5	3.1	20	12.3	0	0
15001-20000	4	2.4	33	20.2	0	0
20001-40000	6	3.7	27	16.6	0	0
40001-1 lakh	0	0	8	4.9	1	0.6
1 lakh-2 lakh	1	0.6	4	2.4	0	0
2 lakh & more	2	1.2	3	1.8	0	0
No response	115	70.6	17	10.4	146	90.2

Source: Sajha Manch

Section XIII - Self-Built Housing

Given the pattern illustrated above of the capacity for self-investment, the question naturally arises whether poor families can build their own housing settlements – as opposed to just their own houses – if they have access to tenurial land and some capital. The answer may be found in the ‘Nirman Majdoor Awas Sthal’, presently located at Badli More, Haiderpur, Outer Ring Road, and consisting of around 250 families. Most of the people are construction labours and were earlier living in a slum at Prashant Vihar, Rohini Sector XIV. As most of the residents of the affluent regular colony of Prashant Vihar wanted to preserve the sanctity of their colony, they were not comfortable with this slum. Consequently, all the houses in the slum were demolished with the help of the police and DDA in February 1990. During that period “Nirman Mazdoor Panchayat Sangram” had mobilised the people and led a strong protest agitation for almost four months. Eventually, DDA had to respond to the agitation and reallocate land to the people at Badli.

On December 1990, the people at the resettlement site at Badli were once again dispossessed when fire gutted their homes. This time they decided to rebuild their colony according to their own requirements and their live understanding of the tenets of urban planning. All the houses of the rebuilt colony were made of bricks on both sides of a 12 feet wide road. 4 houses were grouped into a cluster with a common courtyard of 8 sq. ft. in the front. This design evolved as a measure to prevent the spread of fire within the settlement. The 2 houses in front of each cluster are of 13’ X 8’ and the 2 houses in the back are of 12’ X 10’. The colony has three community bathroom-and-toilet complexes. It also provides for a small school of 33’ X 12’ for the children and a health centre of 12’ X 12’ for all the residents. All these are running smoothly with the direct involvement of the people. Until today, the government and the local authority have never offered any help. This is, therefore, a story of an achievement that re-establishes the fact that, given an adequate opportunity, poor people can plan a housing scheme with shelter and infrastructure facilities with their own initiative and knowledge.

Section XIV - Alternative Policy

We may now define the critical elements of an Alternative Housing Policy as seen from the point of view of the slum dwellers themselves:

- Firstly, it is clear that the vast majority of the city's population (77%) lives in sub-standard or non-existent housing.
- Secondly, the density in the slum clusters has increased six-fold in the last 25 years.
- This state of affairs is manifestly because of the non-availability of accessible and affordable housing for the poor.
- DDA has provided for only 34% of total housing targets in the last 20 years.
- Even this drastically reduced availability of housing has been biased towards the rich with an emphasis on HIG and MIG housing.
- LIG housing has largely been occupied by middle class families because of the high prices.
- Population growth in the city has not been unanticipated by planners. "Surplus" populations have essentially been created by additional (and unplanned) investments by the Governments.
- The migrant population is part of the requirements of the city for labour and most migrants and slum-dwellers are working in the informal sector providing essential services to the city.
- The poor have an average monthly income of Rs 2000 per month and commute to work by foot, cycle, or bus. These are critical to the kind and location of housing they require.
- The Slum Act of 1956 provides for "improvements" of slums, not just "clearance". Experience indicates that In-Situ Upgradation is five times more expensive than Environmental Improvement, while Relocation is twice as expensive as In-Situ Upgradation.
- Nevertheless, both judicial and executive action has focussed on Relocation, which is not only in violation of national and international laws but also completely disruptive of life and livelihood.
- Multi-storeyed housing is not an appropriate option for the poor because of its high cost of maintenance and being prone to commercialisation.

- Contrary to ‘public’ prejudice, land is available for residential purposes both on paper as well as on the ground.
- If this surplus land, ranging between 8,600 ha to 19,600 ha, was to be given over for housing the poor then each slum or pavement dweller would be able to access a minimum of 30 sq.m. of ground space.
- The poor are able to invest an average amount of Rs 40,000 per family in housing and any policy will have to keep this limit in mind.
- The opposition to the equitable distribution of this land comes from vested interests in the ‘regular’ or ‘planned’ colonies and the administration.

The above facts once again underline the fact that the working poor of the city have to be provided with accessible and affordable shelter by the deliberate, affirmative action of the State. “Open market” forces will never be able to achieve this objective. Hence, these arguments give rise to the possibility of a fourth strategy for housing – that of providing additional land wherever (or near) the settlements are located and upgrading the facilities. This is the **In Situ Land Reform** strategy. It is a strategy that supports the unparalleled ‘private’ initiative and entrepreneurship demonstrated by vast numbers of working people to build their own shelters without any ‘subsidies’ from Government.

This policy will have the following components:

1. Locate land within a one kilometre radius of the existing slum whose land use can be appropriately notified as ‘residential’.
2. Allot one plot of 50 sq.m. to each family on leasehold basis on payment of a fee not exceeding Rs 10,000 per plot.
3. Provide connections to basic urban services (water, electricity, sewerage, roads, drainage, dispensaries, schools) at the rate of Rs 200 per sq.m.
4. Supply services through public agencies, and not contractors, according to realistic urban norms.
5. Charge fees for supply of services on a monthly basis as per public policy.
6. Make available housing loans of up to Rs 50,000 on easy terms against mortgage of land.

The estimated additional land and capital requirements for the four different strategies for roughly 6 lakh households are given in Table 20.

Table 20: Comparison of different Strategies

Strategy	Requirement	
	Land (ha)	Cost (Rs.cr)
Environmental Improvement ¹	-	240
In Situ Upgradation ²	-	1200
Total Relocation ³	2160	2760
In Situ Land Reform ⁴	5540	1200

¹ at Rs 4,000 per jhuggi

² at Rs 20,000 per jhuggi

³ at 18 sq.m. plot size with 50% built-up area and Rs 46,000 per jhuggi (Rs 7,000 from jhuggi dweller)

⁴ at 50 sq.m. plot size with 50% built-up area and Rs 20,000 per jhuggi

Such a policy will:

- provide security of tenure to enable investments in proper housing;
- leave the earning capacity and available services of the household undisturbed;
- maintain investments within the earning capacity of the family;
- allow the entrepreneurial spirit of the people free rein;
- give an adequate return on investment to public agencies; and
- enhance the value additions in the quality of life in the city as a whole.

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